Abortion by Sydney Institute of Criminology
  
kw No. 8
THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY
Faculty of Law
\‘1 0/:
9-5 J, .a, ,
A , o t
9' ‘ 4'6
a ' 7 L J-
V5,, 
  
} PROCEEDINGS
‘ ' ,’ I 0F THE
INSTITUTE .OF CRIMINOLOGY‘
I 1970 . _ . . ' No.1
 
Seminar:
. ABORTION
  
REGISTERED IN AUSTRALIA FOR TRANSMISSION BY POST AS A Book
 THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY
Faculty of Law
 
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY
1970 N0. 1
 
Seminar:
ABORTION
  
REGISTERED IN AUSTRALIA FOR TRANSMISSION BY POST AS A BOOK
 
 GENERAL EDITOR
Associate Professor R. P. Roulston
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Professor K. 0. ShatWell
Associate Professor G. J. Hawkins
Mr P. G. McGonigal
Mr P. G. Ward
Mrs B. Shatwell
Sole distributors:
Sydney University Law School,
1 73—1 75 Phillip Street, Sydney,
N.S. W. 2000, Australia
 
7 —__ﬁ1
The Institute of Criminologyy,
Sydney University Law School
Address
173—175 Phillip Street, Sydney, N.S.W. 2000.
The Institute of Criminology is an organization within
the Department of Law of the Sydney University Law
School for teaching and research in criminology and
penology. It is under the immediate direction of the Challis
Professor of Law, Professor K. 0. Shatwell.
Faculty Staff directly associated With the Institute
Challis Professor of Law
K. O. Shatwell, M.A., B.C.L. (Oxford)
Associate Professors
R. P. Roulston, LL.M. (Tas.), LL.B. (Sydney) (Criminal Law)
G. J. Hawkins, B.A. (Wales) (Criminology)
Senior Lecturers
P. C. Ward, B.A., B.E. (Sydney) (Statistics)
W. E. Lucas, M.B., B.S., DP.M. (Sydney), M.A.N.Z.CP.
(Forensic Psychiatry)
Lecturers
G. D. Woods, LL.M., Dip. Ed. (Sydney)
Temporary Lecturer
P. G. McGonigal, LL.B. (Sydney)
Senior Research Assistant
D. Bennett, LLB. (Hons) (London)
Secretary
Miss V. Cooper
Publications Ofﬁcer
Mrs B. Shatwell, B. Com. (Tas.)
N. S. W. Advisory Committee
The Hon. Sir Leslie Herron, K.B.E., C.M.G., LL.B., Chief
Justice of New South Wales. (Chairman)
Mr N. T. W. Allan, M.V.O., Commissioner of Police.
Dr W. A. Barclay, B.Sc. (Med), M.B., B.S., DPM. (Sydney),
N.S. (Adm. Med.) (Columbia), M.A.N.Z.CP., CM.H.A.
(ARA), Director of State Psychiatric Services for
N.S.W.
Dr J.S. Blow, M.B., B.S., DPM., M.A.N.Z.CP., Deputy
Director (Special Services) N.S.W., Department of
Child Welfare and Social Welfare. .
Professor T. Brennan M.A. (Cantab), Professor of Social
Administration in the University of Sydney.
Dr C.J. Cummins, M.B., B.S., D.P.H. (Sydney),
Director-General of Public Health.
Dr J. H. T. Ellard, M.B., B.S., DP.M., M.R.A.C.P.,
Consultant-Psychiatrist and part-time lecturer in
Psychiatry in the University of Sydney.
 
 Professor S. Encel, M.A., Ph.D. (Melb.), Head of the
Department of Sociology in the University of New
South Wales.
Mr M.F. Farquhar, O.B.E., E.D., Dip. Crim. (Sydney),
Chairman of the Stipendiary Magistrates and a Solicitor
of the Supreme Court of N.S.W.
Mr F. D. Hayes, B.A., Dip. Soc. Stud., Dip. Crim. (Sydney),
Dip. Soc. (N.S.W.), Director of Probation and Parole
Services in the N.S.W. Department of Corrective
Services.
Dr W. Hemphill, M.B., _ B.S., D.C.H. (Sydney),
Assistant-Director, N.S.W. Bureau of Maternal and
Child Health.
Mr W. J. Keefe, Principal Probation Officer of the N.S.W.
Adult Probation Service.
Mr ,W.C. Langshaw, B.A., Dip. Soc. Stud. (Sydney),
Under—Secretary and Director, N.S.W. Department of
Child Welfare and Social Welfare.
The Hon. Mr Justice J. A. Lee, B.A., LL.B. (Sydney), a
Justice of the Supreme Court' of N.S.W.
His Honour Judge A. Levine, LL.B. (Sydney), a District
Court, Judge and Chairman of Quarter Sessions.
Mr W. J. Lewer, LLM. (Sydney) Deputy Chairman of the
Stipendiary Magistrates of N.S.W.
The Hon. K.M. McCaw, M.L.A., Attorney-General for New
South Wales.
The Hon. Mr Justice J. H. McClemens, B.A., LL.B. (Sydney),
a Justice of the Supreme Court of N.S.W.
Mr W. R. McGeechan, A.A.S.A., A.C.I.S., Commissioner of
Corrective Services for New South Wales.
Mr C. McKay, LL.B. (Sydney), Clerk of the Peace.
Professor D.C. Maddison, MB, BS, M.R.A.C.P., DPM.,
Professor of Psychiatry in the University of Sydney.
The Hon. J. C. Maddison, B.A., LL.B. (Sydney), M.L.A.,
Minister of Justice for New South Wales .
Mr F.J. Mahony, LL.B. (Sydney), AssistantSecretary,
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.
Mr J. A. Morony, F.R.I.P.A., Member of the Parole Board
of New South
Mr H.A. R. Snelling, LL.B. Q.C., Solicitor-General for ’New
South Wales.
Mr C. K. Ward,formerly Chairman of the New South Wales
Stipendiary Magistrates,
Special Adviser on Alcohol and Drug Addiction
Dr M. S. Dalton, M.A., M.D., M.A.NZ.C.P., DPM., R.C.P. &
8., Director of Wistaria House Alcohol ‘and Drug
Addiction Unit, Department of Public Health.
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SEMINAR ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO ABORTION
IntroductiOn and Summary
Associate-hofessor Gordon Hawkins .........
Chairman’s Opening Address
Associate-Professor R. P. Roulston ........ I .....
A Critique of the Law of Abortion in
New South Wales and England
Professor Rupert Cross ...............
The Psychiatric Problems of the Aborted Woman
Dr R. Vickery ........... _........
Medical Problems of Abortion
An Obstrician’s View
Dr A. H. Bradfield .................
Social Attitudes to and Moral Implications of Abortion
Professor Henry Mayer ........... .. . . .
....10
....19
....26
..‘..34
  
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO ABORTION
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The British Abortion Act (formerly known as the Termination of
Pregnancy Bill) was given the Royal Assent on October 27th 1967. It took
effect on April 27, 1968. Thus Great Britain became the first country in what
is known as the Western World to permit abortion legally and relatively freely.
It may be said therefore that this Seminar on The Law and Practice Relating
to Abortion held in June 1968 was‘ timely.
Moreover it was appropriate that the ﬁrst paper, presented by Professor
Rupert Cross, provided a comparative critique of the legal provisions relating
to abortion in England and New South Wales. It may also be regarded as
appropriate that a seminar designed to consider critically the operation of the
law in this area should be launched by one whose criticism was of a
fundamental nature.
For Professor Cross is, as he says, an advocate of “the repeal of all
prohibitions on abortions properly performed by doctors”. His paper provides
not only a succinct account of the Law of Abortion in New South Wales and
England, but also a clear, unequivocal statement of the case for the view that
“at an appropriately early stage of the pregnancy, every woman should be
able to procure an abortion (subject to proper medical advice) if she wishes to
have one”.
Dr Vickery’s paper on The Psychiatric Problems of the Aborted Woman
is concerned with the psychiatric sequelae‘to abortion. He reports the finding
of the Kinsey Institute study of women who had sought abortions that
“serious psychiatric sequelae to illegal abortion was rare”. He adds that his
own experience “with worn out mothers and unmarried girls” is that they
“tolerate illegal abortions extremely well”.
With regard to therapeutic abortion he,states that whilst it is true that
“psychiatric and serious neurotic depressive illness does follow therapeutic
abbrtion.... the incidence is markedly less than that in pregnancy and
especially after childbirth, in the so-called ‘puerperium’”. He concludes by
saying that “many Australian psychiatrists would appear to support the Royal
Medico-Psychological Association’s memorandum of last year [which
recommended liberalization of abortion law] and the recent United Kingdom
abortion law reform”.
Dr Bradfield’s paper, Medical Problems of Abortion: An Obstetrician’s
View, deals with the practice of abortion from the viewpoint of an,
obstetrician and gynaecologist. He states that the traditional practice in New
South Wales is that “the obstetrician feels reasonably free to act in what he
considers to be the best interests of the patient”. The indications for the
termination of pregnancy he lists as “medical, surgical, psychiatric, foetal,
social and eugenic”. As for illegal abortion in Sydney, Dr Bradﬁeld’s
impression is that it has been “put on a very highly sophisticated basis”, with
sound preoperative assessment, adequate hospital facilities, general anaesthesia
“commonly provided”, operative expertise, post-operative follow-up and “a
low complication rate”.
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Nevertheless Dr Bradfield emphasized the fact that it is a mistake “to
regard induction of abortion as a trivial operation free from risk”. And in the
latter part of his paper he deals with the operative techniques involved in
abortion and some of the complications which may occur.
In conclusion he adverts to Professor Cross’s suggestion that every
woman should be able to procure an abortion if she wishes to have one. Dr
Bradfreld’s view is that “the doctor must be regarded as the best judge of
treatment which would be in the interest of the patient’s mental and physical
health it would be entirely contrary to all accepted surglcal practice
for a patient to decide when an operation should be necessary”.
The final contribution to the seminar, Professor Henry Mayer’s Social
Attitudes to and Moral Implications of Abortion, is both the longest and the
most fully documented paper presented there. Professor Mayer begins with a
prophecy: “Australian abortion laws will change radically and become much
more permissive within the next few years.... The laws are unlikely to
sanction elective abortion but in fact we shall be moving towards this as a de
facto policy”.
He then proceeds to examine the abortion question “from the angle of a
social scientist”, and in so doing is critical of both “the dogmas of religion
and of standard progressivism”. It would however, be impossible to reproduce
in summary ‘form an argument as lengthy and complex as that advanced by
Professor Mayer.
In the latter part of his paper he examines the structure of public
opinion on the subject of abortion including in his analysis surveys conducted
both overseas and in Australia. Professors Mayer’s paper will be especially
valuable to the reader in that he provides copious references to the available
, literature. Moreover in editing his paper he has added a 1970 Postscript which
not only includes a selective list of the more important contributions from the
current flood of material, but also brieﬂy summarizes developments since
1968.
In the discussion which followed the papers, Dr Vickery’s point that,
because it raises problems which involve religious, political, social and
philosophical values, abortion tends to be a contentious issue was clearly
illustrated. One of the highlights of the discussion was an exchange between
Professor Cross and Dr Bradfreld on the subject of what may be called
“abortion on request”. It was inconclusive in that Professor Cross adhered to
his view that he would legalize all properly performed abortions by doctors at
the request of the women, and that “doctors are the servants of the
community not its paternalistic guides”. Dr Bradﬁeld on the other hand
insisted that “a doctor ought, by his training and his special insights, to be in
a position to best assess a women’s physical and mental needs and the likely
impact of any operation that she may request to have performed”.
There was also an interesting exchange between Father Duffy and
Professor Henry Mayer in which Father Duffy argued that in considering
abortion we should not only take account of “the calculus of results”, but
also of “the spiritual calculus of consequences”. Professor Mayer maintained
that “the spiritual calculus is fair enough if you apply it to co-religionists” but
not when it is applied “to other people”.
L—_-—_
 In conclusion it may be mentioned that Professor Cross in the course of
presenting his paper remarked the existence of “a detemrined obscurantist
attitude on the part of the establishment, disinclining eminent lawyers and
eminent doctors from getting down to this very serious problem”. He greatly
deplored this situation. In arranging this seminar the Institute of Criminology
was able to persuade a number of eminent persons from a number of fields
which overlap marginally in this area to get down to this problem.
It was not to be expected that the problem would be resolved or that
any consensus would be achieved. But in so far as the seminar itself and the _
circulation of these papers may contribute to general knowledge and help to
raise the level of public discussion'of the subject of abortion they will have
served a useful purpose. It remains only to thank all those who participated in
the seminar and especially the distinguished authors of the papers which are
contained in this volume.
GORDON HA WKINS
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CHAIRMAN’S OPENING ADDRESS
Associate-Professor R. P. R0ulston*
There is at present a mounting campaign for either a modiﬁcation or
repeal of the existing laws against abortion in this State — a campaign which
seems likely to become increasingly important. Also, in 1967 there was passed
through the English Parliament an Abortion Act which became law in April
1968 and made very major and signiﬁcant changes in the pre-existing law
relating to illegal abortions. In addition, there are moves afoot in both South
Australia and Western Australia to liberalize abortion laws in those States —
moves which seem to have a reasonable chance of success.
In the light of these developments it was considered appropriate that the
Institute of Criminology should conduct a seminar on abortion, not in order
to pass resolutions or make recommendations, but in order to obtain further
illumination of, and insight into, what was recognized to be a highly
controversial matter.
How controversial, I did not fully realize until I began the practical
task of effectively organizing the seminar. Only then did I fully realize the
intense passions and sincere, but conflicting, convictions that exist in the legal
and medical professions in regard to abortion. I am therefore very pleased
with the wonderful response evidenced by the attendance of so many
members at the seminar.
It is a well recognized fact that there are a number of legal abortions
and a very much larger number of illegal abortions performed in New South
Wales each year, but there is difﬁculty in getting accurate facts on both legal
and illegal abortions. I endeavoured in a rather limited way, to obtain some
information from various large hospitals in the metropolitan area, and the
statistical figures that they have revealed have left me, perhaps, even more
bewildered than I was before.
In one hospital, over a 5-year period there were 68 therapeutic abortions
and over the same period there were 14,000 live births; at another hospital
there were 10 therapeutic abortions per 1,000 live births; at another hospital,
over a 4-year period there were 3 therapeutic abortions and 7,000 live births;
at others, the numbers were 1 and 2. Various other hospitals assured me that
over varying periods of 2, 3 and 5 years there had been no abortions at all,
although at one hospital 140 persons had been admitted after what was
described as “spontaneous abortion”.
1' was unable, quite understandably, to obtain any credible and reliable
estimates as to the number of illegal abortions performed each year, but it is
recognized that this is a very large number indeed, informed guesses ranging
from 10,000 to 50,000.
Now, to move the proceedings along a little, I have much pleasure in
introducing Professor Rupert Cross, Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford
University, who will speak to his paper, “A Critique of the Law of Abortion
in New South Wales and England”.
R. P. ROULSTON
* Associate-Professor of Criminal Law at Sydney University Law School.
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A CRITIQUE OF THE LAW OF ABORTION
IN NEW SOUTH WALES AND ENGLAND
Professor Rupert Cross“
1. A STATEMENT OF THE LAW
(a) New South Wales
The lawof abortion in New South Wales is set out in Ss.82—84 of the
Crimes Act, which read as follows:
“82, Whosoever, being a woman with child,
unlawfully administers to herself any drug or noxious thing; or
unlawfully uses any instrument or other means,
with intent in any such case to procure her miscarriage, shall be liable to penal
servitude for ten years.
83. Whosoever —
unlawfully administers to, or causes to be taken by, any woman, whether
with child or not, any drug or noxious thing; or
unlawfully uses any instrument or other means,
with intent in any such case to procure her miscarriage, shall be liable to penal
servitude for ten years.
84. Whosoever unlawfully supplies or procures any drug or noxious thing,
or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be
unlawfully used with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether with
child or not, shall be liable to penal servitude for ﬁve years.”
For the time being, I am only concerned With S. 83. [will refer brieﬂy
in Section 3, to the problem of the woman who procures or attempts to
procure her own miscarriage, but I.will say nothing of such academic
problems as the possibility of convicting a woman who mistakenly believes
herself to be pregnant and of procuring the commission of an offence under
S. 83. Neither do I propose to discuss the merits of the rule of law, common
to England and New South Wales, according to which a doctor who performs
an unlawful abortion with the utmost care is guilty of manslaughter if a
tragedy ensues and the patient dies. The rule is an example of a penal policy
which, though commonly accepted, I find difﬁcult to justify, namely, the
policy according to which punishment is properly increased if a greater harm
than that which was intended is inflicted, albeit wholly without'negligence.
This leaves me with the question of defences to a charge under S.§3.We
are primarily concerned with the legality of, or the desirability of legalizing,
abortions which are properly performed by doctors. If such an'operation has
been performed, and the doctor is charged under S. 83, the only defence
generally thought to be open to him depends on the summing~up given at the
English Central Criminal Court in the case of Boume in 1939. I gather that it
* M.A., D.C.L., Vinerian Professor of Law, Oxford University.
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is assumed that Bourne’s case would be valid in New South Wales and my
very limited study of the law of New South Wales leads me to suppose that
the assumption is sound.
It will be recollected that Dr Bourne, a well-known gynaecologist who
advocated reform of the law of abortion, gave himself up to the police after
terminating the pregnancy, caused by rape, of a girl of fourteen. Before
operating, Dr Bourne had consulted a fellow gynaecologist and each of them
was satisﬁed that if the pregnancy has been allowed to continue the mother
would have become a mental wreck, although her life would not have been in
any immediate danger. Bourne was duly prosecuted, and he was acquitted
after the judge had told the jury that the prosecution had to prove that the
operation had not been performed for the purpose of preserving the girl’s life
in' the sense of a normal, healthy existence.
Between 1939 and 1967, Bourne’s case must have been acted on as a
justification for the performance of a large number of abortions properly
carried out by doctors. It is, of course, without the slightest intention of
casting doubt on the bona ﬁdes of the great majority of the medical
profession that I suggest that, in the case of some of these abortions, the
danger to the mother’s health which would have been occasioned by the
continuance of the pregnancy was slight. There is, however, the inevitable
drawback of any rule the administration of which is dependent on expert
opinion. The practice is liable to vary considerably. I have no reason to
suppose that there is any less degree of variation in the ease with which
therapeutic abortions can be obtained in New South Wales than in England,
where the variation is commonly believed to be considerable.
At different times between 1939 and 1968, English doctors expressed
concern about the permanency of the decision in Bourne’s case. Was it
certain that the case would be followed by other puisnejudges? Might it be
condemned by an appellate court? Almost any English lawyer would have said
that such fears were groundless, but they are bound to be expressed by
professional men on crucial points at which the law impinges on their
professional activities when the law is not clearly set out in legislation for all
to behold and behove. Although I know nothing about medical opinion on
the point in New South Wales, I should have thought that anxiety of the kind
that I have mentioned would be all the more likely to occur in a jurisdiction
in which the principle'of Bourne’s case has never been adopted in a reported
decision. At the very least, there may be a case for casting that principle into
legislative form in this State.
Taken by itself, such a step would, in the opinion of many, be a wholly
inadequate measure. If the only circumstances in which a properly performed
abortion is lawful are those contemplated in Bourne’s case the law is too strict
to be acceptable to a large body of opinion. It makes no allowance for the
case in which a doctor has good ground for believing that the child will be
born with a serious mental or physical incapacity, although the mother’s
health will not be adversely affected by the continuance of the pregnancy; it
makes no allowance for cases in which the health of other children of the
woman would be adversely affected by the birth of a further child; it makes
no allowance for cases in which the woman’s pregnancy was caused by a
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sexual offence against her. I am unaware of any decision which precludes a
judge in New South Wales from holding that abortions performed in any of
these circumstances are lawful, but I suspect that the probability of such a
holding is remote. In any event, if the circumstances in which an abortion is
lawful are to be increased it must surely be common ground among the
lawyers of New South Wales that the matter is one for legislation. Matters of
such vital public importance cannot be left to the chance of a particular point
coming before the courts. Recent English legislation on the subject of
abortion should therefore be of interest in New South Wales.
(b) England
Sections 58—59 of the Offences Against the Person Act,
1861, contain prohibitions on abortions and the supply of
instruments or drugs for the purpose of abortion substantially the
same as those of 85. 82—84 of the New South Wales Crimes Act;
but these English provisions must now be read in the light of the
Abortion Act 1967. The relevant portions of that Act read as
follows:
“1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an
offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a
registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the
opinion, formed in good faith —
the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of
the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than
if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve
such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of
this section, account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably
forseeable environment.
(37 Except as provided by subsection (4) of this section, any treatment for
the termination of pregnancy must be carried out in a hospital vested in the
Minister of Health or the Secretary of State under the National Health Service Acts,
or in a place for the time being approved for the purposes of this section by the
said Minister or the Secretary of State.
(4) Subsection (3) of this section, and so much of subsection (1) as relates to
the opinion of two registered medical practitioners, shall not .apply to the
termination of a pregnancy by a registered medical practitioner in a case where he
is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the temiination is immediately
necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant woman.
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of
“4. (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any
duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to
participate in any treatment authorized by this Act to which he has a conscientious
objection:
Provided that in any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious
objection shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it.
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(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall affect any duty to
participate in treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.
(3) In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement on oath by
any person to the effect that he has a conscientious objection to participating in
any treatment authorized by this Act shall be sufﬁcient evidence for the purpose of
discharging the burden of proof imposed upon him by subsection (1) of this
section."
Legislative effect has thus been given in England to the principle of R.
v. Bourne; but far more important is the fact that the Act declares that
abortions- are lawful if performed to prevent the birth of a seriously
handicapped child or injury to the health of another child in the woman’s
family. The omission of the case in which the woman has been the victim of a
sexual offence and pregnancy resulted is, from the theoretical point of view,
little short of breathtaking as the plain intention was to liberalize the law.
Intercourse with girls under sixteen is stringently prohibited and yet the law
prohibits the termination of the worst effects of such intercourse — the girl’s
pregnancy; a law which prohibits awoman who:has been the victimofone of the
grossest wrongs known to the law, rape, taking steps to have the pregnancy
for which she is in no way responsible terminated is Draconian in its severity.
The objection that the doctor asked to perform the abortion would not know
whether the girl or woman had been the victim of a sexual offence is quite
unconvincing. Abortions of all girls under sixteen at the time of conception
could be made lawful if requested by the girl’s parents or guardians. The fact
that the police were prepared to treat the case as one of rape could easily be
made sufﬁcient to render the abortion lawful. The reason I have described the
omission as breathtaking only from the theoretical point of view is that I
strongly suspect that, in most cases in which a girl or woman has been made
pregnant in consequence of a sexual offence, a doctor would come to the
conclusion that the continuance of the pregnancy would be seriously
detrimental to her health; but this raises the important question of the role of
the medical profession in relation to abortion, a question best considered after
a further proposal for reform has been considered.
II. A DRASTIC SUGGESTION
I wish to be numbered among the by no means insignificant quantity of
persons who advocate the repeal of all prohibitions on abortions properly
performed by doctors. I give below three reasons which impel me to the
conclusion that at an appropriately early stage of the pregnancy, every woman
should be able to procure an abortion (subject to proper medical advice) if
she wishes to have one. Before enumerating those reasons and discussing some
of the pros and cons I must say a little about the basis of the law of abortion.
The basis of that law is “Thou shalt not take any life”, whether the
proscription be regarded as a divine command or as an ethical or social rule. If
human personality begins at conception, those for whom the proscription is a
divine command must, so far as I can see, condemn all abortions as entailing
the deliberate destruction of a living human foetus. The extent to which those
who hold such opinions are prepared to recognize that politics is the art of
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the possible presumably varies considerably. For aught I know, there may be
devout Roman Catholics who, though they cannot condone the performance
of an abortion by a co-religionist, even on facts such as those of Boume’s
case, are prepared to acquiesce in an extensive liberalization of the law on the
ground that, in the imperfect world in which they find themselves, an
absolute prohibition of abortion does more harm than good if only because
it encourages resort to the backstreet abortionist.
I am quite incapable of discussing the medical aspects of the statement
that human personality begins at conception. No doubt there is a sense in
which the statement is true, but the fact that the life (if that is the right word
for the foetus) is entirely dependent on the mother may be thought to justify
legislation on the lines of the English Abortion Act according to which the
mother is entitled to have her pregnancy terminated on what may be broadly
described as social grounds; the preservation of the mother’s health or that of
another child of hers, or the prevention of the birth of a seriously
handicapped child are social values in the name of which the life of the
embryo may be destroyed. Presumably it is along lines such as these that
those who consider that human personality begins at birth, and base the
general prohibition of abortions upon a social or ethical rule that innocent life
must not be taken, would seek to justify exceptions to the general
prohibition. They may also seek to justify the general prohibition on two
further grounds, the maintenance of the population and the preservation of
the sanctity of life.
So far as the first ground is concerned, I do not propose to discuss the
merits of laws designed to combat a declining birth rate-Suffice it to say that
the birth rate is not declining now. In any event, it is open to question
whether a country whose'population is prepared to abort on a gargantuan
scale rather than propagate deserves anything other than a decreasing
population. It is anybody’s guess how great the increase in abortions would be
if all prohibitions on properly performed abortions were removed tomorrow.
The increase may not be a very vast one; it is reasonable to suppose that most
pregnant women want to have their child and of those who do not a fair
proportion would not be inclined to resort to abortion. The possible
detrimental'effect of the legalizing of all properly performed abortions on the
notion of the sanctity of life can be considered in conjunction with the first
of my reasons for canvassing such a drastic change in the law.
My three reasons are the ineffectiveness of the present law, the
prevalence of the backstreet abortionist, and the undesirability of the birth of
unwanted children. It must be appreciated that l have the English scene
primarily in mind, but I would be surprised if what I have to say has no
bearing on the situation in New South Wales.
The Effectiveness of the Law
There is a fantastic variation in the suggested statistics, necessarily based
to a large extent on guesswork, relating to the performance of unlawful
abortions in England. Sometimes the figure given iS 30,000 a year, but
200,000 is also mentioned; yet the English criminal statistics for 1966 give the
number of abortions known to the police as 208 and the number cleared up
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as 189. In the case of every offence the annual gap between the number
actually committed and those known to the police is probably a striking one,
but can there be any to equal this? As often as not, the abortionist who is
prosecuted is a professional without qualifications or one who has caused one
of his or her patients illness. The time has come for us to recognize that such
prosecutions are inspired as much by the desire to suppress the unqualiﬁed
and occasionally incompetent abortionist as by the hope of substantially
reducing the number of unlawful abortions. I admit to a belief that the
number of abortions would increase if properly performed abortions were
legalized but I have already suggested that the increase might not be a great
one, and it would be in legal operations performed with that high degree of
skill we have all come to expect of the medical profession.
The only argument that I can think of in favour of the continuance of
the present ineffective law of abortion is that its repeal so far as abortions
properly performed by doctors are concerned would be the thin end of the
wedge. If abortions are to be lawful on the mere request of the woman to a
doctor, why not legalize the killing of babies soon after birth by their mothers
or at their mother’s request? To this and all other variants of the wedge
argument, I would reply that, from the legal point of view, it is convenient to
treat human life as beginning at birth. The reason is that, from that moment,
a baby ceases to be necessarily under the control of its mother. It is arguable
that there is no moral distinction between a mother who requests a doctor to
terminate her pregnancy because he says that the chances are that the child
will be born with a serious handicap, and a mother who requests a doctor to
kill her baby soon after birth because she is told that the baby will only
survive with some serious handicap. The argument would turn on the
definition of morality; but even if the answer were that there is no moral
distinction it is highly expedient that the law should draw distinction. The
wedge argument does have some force once a child has been born. If it is
liable to be killed by or at the request of its mother, how long is it to be
subject to this liability? This is not the place to discuss the case for
euthanasia, either of the very young or the very old; but the case does
seem to me to be called upon to face arguments of the “wedge” nature
which are not available against the case for the performance of abortions by
doctors at the woman’s request.
The Backstreet Abortionist
There would be something to be said for putting the encouragement it
offers to the backstreet abortionist at the top of the list of objections to the
present law. In each year a certain number of women must die quite
unnecessarily in consequence of the activities of such abortionists and it is
unnecessary to enlarge on the objections to their practices. The backstreet
abortionist, an expression which I use to cover any abortionist from a shady
doctor to an unclean old woman who does an occasional young girl “a good
turn”, will certainly continue to exist so long as abortions by doctors are
illegal in the case of healthy women who have no family problems and carry
healthy children. My reason for putting the objection under consideration
second on my list is the existence of some evidence that resort to the
backstreet abortionist continues in countries where abortions properly
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performed by doctors have been legalized in all cases. The cause may be
financial, but there may also be cases in which the shame of going to hospital
in order to be aborted accounts for the recourse to an illegal abortion. It is
however important to bear in mind that law can have a long term effect on
public opinion. If women who have the misfortune to become pregnant
against their will and wish to have their pregnancy terminated constantly go
to hospital, the occasion may gradually cease to be regarded as shameful, even
when the woman is unmarried.
The Unwanted Child
The present general prohibition on properly performed abortions
undoubtedly increases the number of unwanted children who are born each
year. It is unnecessary to enlarge on this objection to the law. I suspect that I
attach less weight to it than do many other people. It seems to me that the
remedy may be an alteration in society’s attitude towards illegitimacy. In
any event adoption is becoming a relatively simple matter.
III. FURTHER QUESTIONS
The suggestion that all abortions properly performed, at the mother’s
request, by doctors, should be lawful gives rise to further questions. What is
likely to be the reaction of the medical profession? Should all abortions be
performed in hospitals? Should the prohibition on abortions by persons who
are not doctors be absolute? Should the present prohibition on women
aborting or attempting to abort themselves be retained?
The Medical Profession
I think that most people would approve of the insertion in any
legislation legalizing abortions of a provision on the lines of Section 4(1) of
the English statute, freeing those with conscientious objections from any
obligation to perform the operation apart from such obligation as might in
exceptional circumstances be imposed by the common law. In a letter to the
London Times of 29 April 1968 the Secretary of the British Medical
Association criticized the provision of the English Act legalizing abortions if
the continuance of the pregnancy would affect the health of another child of
the woman. He said, however, that as the provision is now law, the
performance of an abortion in accordance with it could not be regarded as an
infringement of medical ethics. The performance of an abortion at request is
unethical by the standards of the medical profession in England and New
South Wales. Would it continue to be unethical if such abortions were
legalized? I am not competent to answer this question. I recognize that any
general removal of the prohibition on abortions could be wrecked if a
sufﬁcient number of doctors refused on conscientious grounds to perform the
operation; but it would surely be a very grave step for a professional body to
declare that to be contrary to professional ethics which the legislature
approves. Doctors are the servants of the community, not its paternalistic
guides.
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Hospitals
It will have been observed that the English Act contains the general
requirement that the operations it permits should take place in hospital.
Although I do not pretend to have pronounced views on the subject, I would
favour the inclusion of such a provision in legislation legalizing the
performance of abortions by doctors on request. I can give three reasons for
this view. In the ﬁrst place, the decision to have an abortion is one which a
woman should only make after the most serious consideration and the most
thorough medical advice. The fact that the operation had to be performed in
a hospital and not at home would emphasize the seriousness of the occasion.
Secondly, the fact that the operation could not be performed in a private
nursing home would serve to free the practice of abortion from the all too
prevalent and, at present, all too justiﬁed belief that there is one law of
abortion for the rich and one for the poor. Finally, it is important that
records of abortions should be kept, and the practice of keeping records is
likely to be best maintained if the general rule is that all abortions should
take place in hospitals. It must be admitted, however, that teething troubles
are being experienced in England in relation to this very question of records.
The Unqualified Abortionist
It is arguable that the performance of an abortion by someone who
lacks the requisite medical qualifications is always a negligent act.
Accordingly, there may be those who would say that it would be sufficient, in
New South Wales, simply to repeal S. 83 of the Crimes Act, leaving the
unqualiﬁed abortionist to be prosecuted where appropriate under S. 54 for
causing grievous bodily harm by a negligent act or omission. It would not be
possible to adopt an analogous course in England because we have no such
general crime of causing bodily harm by negligence as that created by S. 54 of
the Crimes Act. In any event, the seriousness of the occasion seems to warrant
a special absolute prohibition on the performance of abortions by unqualified
persons. The common law is capable of dealing with the exceptional
circumstances of emergency when it becomes necessary for an unqualiﬁed
person to operate.
The woman who operates on herself
It is so dangerous for a woman to seek to procure her own miscarriage
that, in spite of my firm adherence to John Stuart Mill’s general principle that
the criminal law should intervene only to prevent harm to others, I am not
sure that I would object on principle to the continuance of a provision like S.
82 of the New South Wales Crimes Act which punishes a woman who seeks to
procure her own miscarriage. The provision raises very difficult theoretical
issues concerning the extent to which the law can be paternalistic. When, if at
all, is it right for the law to seek to prevent people from doing harm to
themselves? I do not propose to go into those issues now. I am opposed to
the continuance of a provision like S. 82 because I believe it to be completely
futile. Has any woman ever been prevented from seeking to abort herself by
the reﬂection that the conduct is illegal? The deterrent is the woman’s very
natural dislike of producing harmful consequences to herself. Many women
may have been driven to self abortion by the fact that it is illegal for a doctor
to procure their miscarriages, but that is simply a further argument for thesuggestion made in Section 2.
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CONCLUSION
It is customary to examine jurisprudential issues raised by proposals to
reform the law of abortion in terms of the relationship of law and morals. To
what extent should conduct which is normally considered to be sinful or
revolting be punished by the law as such? I am the last person to doubt the
importance of this question, although I doubt whether it is a particularly
realistic question in the case of abortion because I doubt whether most people
in England or New South Wales consider the practice to be either sinful or
especially revolting. The point I wish to make, however, is that, once the
problem is considered in the terms of the efﬁcacy of the law, of the extent to
which the law can be expected to inﬂuence people’s conduct, the solution is
easy. Legally, the prohibition does comparatively little to prevent abortions.
In this, more than in other cases, legal prohibitiOn carries many evils in its
wake; that is why I would abolish the prohibition.
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THE PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS OF THE ABORTED WOMAN
Dr R. Vickery*
Since abortion, and especially therapeutic abortion, raises problems
which directly involve religious, political, social and philosophical values, it is
not surprising that the psychiatric literature and comment about abortion take
on the nature of a debate.-Whilst this is obviously less so in cultures where
abortion reform has been more liberal for some time, as in Russia and to a
lesser extent in Japan and the Scandinavian countries, it is in English speaking
countries such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, where
liberalization has been delayed, that psychiatric opinion about abortion and its
sequelae is so varied. Glanville Williams in 1958 said that in its treatment of
the consenting mother English law on abortion was theoretically the most
ferocious in the world. The fact that we have waited so long to consider
changing these theoretically ferocious laws suggests certain cultural differences
in themselves [from countries such as Russia. This means to me that any
assessment of other countries’ experiences with therapeutic abortion and its
sequelae have always to be psychiatrically considered in this context.
Now there are psychiatrists, as there are gynaecologists, who have
subjective, personal, usually religious, reasons for believing that abortion can
never be therapeutic, and whose bias is obvious in reporting sequelae in
therapeutic abortion. There are others just as subjective who claim that
psychiatric morbidity after abortion is a myth, and who say that any ill
effects of induced abortion are exaggerated, and even see this as a means of
reinforcing cultural and sexual taboos. Over all, I feel that from the
psychiatric viewpoint it is significant that in the recent United Kingdom
abortion reform changes the Royal Medico~psychological Association in its
memorandum recommended liberalization of abortion law rather wider than
their A. M. A. and obstetric and gynaecological colleagues, and that they felt
that consideration should be given to the remote effects of the pregnancy on
the entire family unit. Now, there is no indication- as yet in the Australian
medical literature of any strong body of psychiatric opinion against the new
United Kingdom laws, but I think it is too early to assess this yet.
As a background to later discussions, of the psychiatric sequelae of
abortion I felt that it was useful to consider ﬁrst the variables in relation to
women themselves who come along to us apparently motivated to seek
abortion. I say “motivated” expressly to indicate the need, except perhaps in
cases of subnormal mentality, marked psychosis or irresponsibility, that the
decision to terminate should come from the mother herself. Obviously the
marital status of a woman is allrimportant, for various reasons. Kinsey’s
research group, in his third and last book in the United States in the late
19505, showed that among unmarried women, where taboos against
illegitimacy were stronger, there was a much higher rate of illegal abortion.
For similar reasons widows, divorcees and women who were separated from
their husbands sought abortion much more frequently. Abortion is also the
problem of married women who have several children; the more children the
*M. B., B. S., D. P. M., M. A. N. Z. C. P., Consultant Psychiatrist,
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Medical Centre, Sydney.
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more likely she is to seek abortion. It has been interesting in the psychiatric
literature to see that Scandinavian psychiatrists until recently have puzzled at
the lack of reference by English or American colleagues to the so-called
“worn-out mother” syndrome. In the United States Kinsey’s group studies of
women who had sought abortion found that of a random group 94 per cent
had sought illegal abortion and only 6 per cent had been therapeutically
aborted. They suggested that serious psychiatric sequelae to illegal abortion
was rare. My experience with worn-out mothers and unmarried girls, all things
being equal, is that they not only tolerate illegal abortions extremely well but
are so relieved at times that they refuse to name their backyard abortionist
even in dying depositions. By the same token, many of us have had patients,
married and unmarried, who claim to have had a staggering number of illegal
abortions without any apparent unfavourable psychiatric sequelae. A woman’s
social and economic status in our culture appears to play some role in her
decision to seek abortion. Most studies of unmarried girls suggest that those in
the higher socio-economic group sought abortion rather more readily than
their lower cultural counterparts, who more often tended towards “shotgun”
marriage. The degree of religious devoutness of a woman will both inﬂuence
her decision to seek abortion and determine an unfavourable reaction to it —
especially guilt. For obvious reasons women of staunch Roman Catholic faith,
for instance, would feel guilty even in contemplation of abortion and even on
medical grounds such as disease or cancer. Now, in these cases we have
logically the inconsistency of the same woman urgently demanding an
abortion for realistic motives and at the same time rejecting it. Without
necessarily considering religious devoutness, it is our feeling that conscientious
women, with a strong or punishing conscience, seem more prone to guilt
feelings, regret and depression after an abortion. This group of women,
particularly if unmarried, are obviously much more shameful of being
pregnant in the first instance, and for this reason terrified of exposure.
Moreover they are as well much more susceptible to implicit criticism or
hostility from either medical or nursing staff during and after termination or
as‘a result of a decision about termination.
An important factor to be considered is an assessment of a woman’s
motivation to have an abortion, and how much her decision is made or
inﬂuenced by her husband, her parents or the putative father. There is a
well-known Swedish study by Ekblad in 1955 of the effects of therapeutic
'abortion, which suggested an increased risk of serious self-reproach about the
abortion in cases where the woman had been inﬂuenced by others to seek
submission for termination. By the same token, it has been interesting to me
to see at times how doctors, including psychiatrists, have tried to persuade
women either to have or not to have an abortion, and usually with quite
different motives from those of interested relatives. I personally feel that this
could be a factor in increasing the incidence in these women of post abortal
guilt.
I feel cultural factors have to be considered in regard to both the
motivation to have therapeutic abortion and the production of guilt feelings
after it. Ready availability, staff attitudes, keeping of records, public
submission to medical, obstetric and psychiatric review, all these are just some
of the variables which will inhibit many women from seeking legalized  
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abortion. In the unmarried group, where secrecy is usually felt to be all
important, there would seem to be good reasons for assuming that in our
culture there will still be be many girls turning to illegal abortion rather than
undergoing the public hospital exposure of a therapeutic abortion.
Finally, it would seem to me that the over-all personality or ego
strength of women seeking abortion must remain a major factor in the
decision to seek abortion and the response to it afterwards, and those of us
who have had the conﬁdence of, for instance, unmarried nurses, university
students, trainee teachers, and other girls with good ego resources, are
frequently surprised at the strength that these girls show when faced with an
unwelcome or unwanted pregnancy, and the number of times in which they
will arrange an illegal abortion with virtually no advice or assistance from
anyone, although some of this is obviously from their guilt and their need for
secrecy.
In turning now to the psychiatric sequelae of abortion, 1 would prefer
to exclude spontaneous abortion, because this must occur in many women
motivated to continue the pregnancy, and here regret and even guilt and
depression can follow after these spontaneous abortions, particularly when the
original feeling about the pregnancy was one of not wanting it. I only
mention this group because so many studies of the sequelae of abortion
include this group with induced abortion and tend therefore to load the
responses suggestive of regret and guilt rather higher than they would
otherwise have been.
Much more information is available psychiatrically in regard to
therapeutic than illegal abortions, for obvious reasons. Kinsey’s research group,
which I mentioned before, where, they had 94 per cent of women who had
been illegally aborted, was a retrospective study. I felt that their findings were
signiﬁcant so far as the United States was concerned, and so far as showing '
that less than 10 per cent of these women, in retrospect, reported
psychological upset over their illegal abortions, and of those who did, it was
largely in general emotion terms in much the same way as people describe
their response to broken engagements, bereavements, etc. While this was by no
means a careful study of psychiatric sequelae to illegal abortion, the study
does appear to show reasonable statistical evidence of no subsequent sterility
or damage to the woman’s capacity for orgasm. In other words, this could be
interpreted as significant evidence that there is no major sexual maladjustment
as a result of therapeutic, or more particularly, illegal abortion.
In reviewing the literature in regard to therapeutic abortion one is struck
by two factors. Firstly, in countries like Russia and Japan where legal
abortion is less restricted and where the greatest number of abortions are
.performed, there is little reported evidence of' post abortal psychiatric
sequelae, except in cases where a psychiatric illness was present before the
abortion; but one is struck in all reports by the lack of information in regard
to premorbid personality or previous psychiatric illness in aborted women who
did have sequelae, and the failure in many instances by doctors to follow up
women for a long enough post-abortal period. Secondly, in countries less
permissive (and I include now the Scandinavian and European countries) it did
seem that therapeutic abortion in these cases was followed more often by
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guilt, regret or remorse over the abortion. Almost all European, and some
Japanese, studies indicated immediate post-abortal feelings of mild or serious
self reproach in an average of about 25 per cent of cases. Those studies which
extended beyond the post-abortal period suggested that the guilt feelings or
the regret about the abortion did become-much less marked with time. But
more information and much larger follow-up studies are needed to conﬁrm
this.
Many studies stressed the high incidence of pregnancies following
therapeutic abortion, especially in Japanese and European countries, and there
was a tendency to equate this high incidence of pregnancies with regret and
guilt in the immediate post-abortal period. This must certainly be the case
with some women. The more ready availability of contraceptive pills and
other contraceptive measures in our culture raises doubts as to how often
compulsive pregnancy is important in this case, but no study, I feel. gives
sufficient evidence to say that women fall pregnant again after therapeutic
abortion purely and simply as a restitution for the abortion itself. I feel that
in other instances the pregnancy which occurs after the therapeutic abortion
may represent an inner unconscious need to be pregnant. We see this quite
frequently in grandmothers in their late 30s and 403 whose children have just
produced an infant themselves and who have jealous feelings and a need to
identify with their daughters in so many ways. I think sometimes it may be
simply a healthy response to changed circumstances when women fall
pregnant after a therapeutic abortion, and of course others of us less
charitable might say it was pure carelessness. Be that as it may, there is a high
incidence of pregnancy following therapeutic abortions, and, for an example, a
study in Japan shows 30 per cent of women followed for twelve months post
therapeutic abortion regretted the abortion and 50 per cent of them were
pregnant within 18 months. Now, we could call this a recidivist group, and
this group hasiprompted psychiatrists and gynaecologists to suggest that legal
abortion in this group (which is essentially the married group) should be
reserved for those who have sterilization performed at the same time. In other
words, we ensure that the woman has no regrets about abortion beforehand.
There is a body of psychiatric opinion — including my own — which believes
that the psychiatric sequelae and problems of sterilization should be
considered separately from abortion, at a later date if possible.
As mentioned before, the greater the premorbid conscientiousness and
religious devoutness the more likely is the woman, especially if unmarried, to
regret the pregnancy and the abortion. There is a tendency by many authors
to equate guilt or regret with psychiatric debility, especially depressive illness.
Now certainly psychiatric and serious neurotic depressive illness does follow
therapeutic abortion, but the incidence is markedly less than in pregnancy and
especially after childbirth in the puerperium. Again quoting Ekblad’s study of
1955, he found that post-abortal (post therapeutic abortion) 14 per cent of
women had moderate guilt and 11 per cent serious gniilt, but of that number
only 1 per cent were sufficiently disabled by guilt or depressive illness as to
be unable to carry out their household duties or their work. A very interesting
and worthwhile study by Simon and Centuria reviewed ﬁve European studies
which they felt could be logically compared and showed that the ﬁndings
ranged from 43 per cent of women with severe guilt post abortion, an
additional 12 per cent with psychiatric illness, to 0 per cent in both
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categories. Again I would stress the lack of information in so many reports
about the premorbid personality of the women who did become disabled post
abortion and regarding the effect of the passage of time on the responses of
these women.
Some psychiatrists argue that pregnant women never suicide and should
never be aborted because of suicidal threats, but this is not true. Others
suggest that post abortal suicide does not occur. This is also not true. What
does seem to be substantiated is that post abortal suicide and psychotic
depression do occur, but less commonly than in the puerperium after natural
conﬁnement. What is probably just as signiﬁcant is that many cases of serious
depressive psychotic illness beginning or worsening in pregnancy are not cured
by termination alone but, for other dynamic reasons, require added
psychiatric therapy as a treatment for the psychosis or depression, including
hospitalization, drug treatment, or even shock treatment. It is this group
especially which have been aborted therapeutically in this country, and to
some extent also in the United States and the United Kingdom. It is
interesting that some Scandinavian studies suggest that women refused
abortion on psychiatric grounds did rather better afterwards, from the
psychiatric viewpoint, than those who were therapeutically aborted; but it is
also obvious that those who were aborted were aborted because of serious
psychiatric disturbance at the time, or because of their overall psychiatric
vulnerability — factors which would deﬁnitely increase the risk of after effects
of abortion. I think that it is signiﬁcant, furthermore, that good Swedish
studies have shown that not less than 50 per cent of women who became
disabled after therapeutic abortion had been under care in a psychiatric
institution at some time prior to their abortion. I think that it is significant,
too, that we don’t know for sure how many women refused abortion in
Scandinavian countries resorted to illegal abortion later. This is a ﬁeld which
is very much in need of study, and I am sure that the English psychiatrists
will be studying this now, with their new laws.
As a sidelight to this, and perhaps another issue, is the very conclusive
(to me) body of Scandinavian evidence in relation to what I would call the
unwanted child. Professor Forsman of Sweden in 1960 followed up for 21
years a group of children who were born of mothers whose applications for
therapeutic abortion were refused in the years 1939—1940, when abortion was
first legalized in Sweden. I think his ﬁndings were significant in the sense of
showing over 50 per cent of these “unwanted children” to be living in
precarious circumstances with a signiﬁcantly higher incidence of poor
education, psychiatric consultations, criminal tendencies and maladjustment.
To get back now to psychiatric sequelae to abortion, there is overall
agreement that women with diagnosed psychiatric illness or insufﬁciency prior
to abortion continue to have some difﬁculty afterwards. These women can
become worse or psychotic post abortion, and certainly need careful
psychiatric observation and follow up. But the evidence seems that the overall
risk of their developing a serious psychiatric illness during the pregnancy, and
especially after c0nfinement,if they are allowed to go to term, is very much
higher. It would seem to me that the women who were in the past
therapeutically aborted for serious psychiatric illness, especially depression,
were the ones who. were most likely to develop psychiatric illness after
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abortion. Despite this, even if the situation could become temporarily worse,
most psychiatrists would advise termination therapeutically. They would
prefer to support and treat a woman after therapeutic abortion than
throughout and after her pregnancy, with a greater risk of serious puerperal
complications. This is quite apart from any feelings that they may have about
the ill effects that mothers who are not aborted may have on the rest of the
family unit, and particularly on the “unwanted child” when it is eventually
born.
As a sidelight, it is interesting to see, especially.in psychiatrically
vulnerable and, quite often, pre-psychotic women the so-called “anniversary
reaction” after abortion. This is usually a depressive reaction, and it can
appear after either illegal or therapeutic abortion. These women, on either the
anniversary of the date of the abortion or the expected date of the birth, of
the child had the abortion not occurred, developed a significant depressive
illness, and quite often this went on to suicidal attempts.
But even when women are considered to be psychiatrically vulnerable,
abortions do not always make things worse. In many cases assumed to be
extremely vulnerable abortion is,psychiatrically, a most insignificant event. In
others it is a stabilizing factor. A large number of women who are seriously
disturbed before the operation respond well and improve mentally following
it.
In regard to the effect on a woman’s attitude to either her husband or
her sexual partner, this seems to be enormously variable. Whilst Kinsey’s
group studies of illegal abortion suggest no serious long term disturbance of
sexual or marital relationships, the immediate effects on a woman’s attitude
of the discovery of an unwanted pregnancy and the subsequent abortion are
less clear. Psychiatrists such as Deutsch say that the woman’s attitude to the
man is often disturbed in a most decisive manner by an unwanted pregnancy.
He is sometimes prevented from interfering, with even a tendency to eliminate
him entirely in an illegal abortion. Moreover, the immediate effect of an
abortion is frequently that, despite the best understanding of the partners
before the abortion, a change, even if temporary, takes place in the woman
afterwards. It is as if she says, “I am not the same as before”. Strangely, the
stronger the love relationship that may have existed prior to the abortion, the
stronger may be the feeling in the woman of being devalued. Realistically, this
attitude does not normally last, and it is obviously so much determined by
the premorbid personalities of both the woman and her partner or husband,
but it would appear to be more common in unmarried women. These
attitudes are much more common in premorbid disturbed women, particuarly
those with delayed sexual maturation and insecurity in the feminine and
maternal roles. It is our impression that a number of women with repressed
feelings of inferiority or insecurity in the maternal role, whilst unconsciously
wanting abortion, are made to feel devalued and guilty by the thought of
abortion.
To conclude, I would indicate that many Australian psychiatrists would
appear to support the Royal Medico-psychological Association’s memorandum
of last year and the recent United Kingdom abortion reform law. To go
further and consider the unrestricted right of any woman to decide to have an
abortion, as in Russia, is a slightly .easier decision for psychiatrists than it is  
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for gynaecologists. Abortion is a surgical procedure with physical risks, and
the gynaecologist is the one who must assume this responsibility. To abrogate
this responsibility to the decision of the patient is considered by some doctors
to be a violation of the standards of medical practice. They say that in no
other medical situation would doctors permit their patients to assume such
responsibility. On the other hand, most psychiatrists would want to ensure
that unrestricted abortion reform would lead to less post abortion psychiatric
sequelae both in the woman and, more particularly, her family. It would seem
possible that unrestricted abortion could lead to less guilt and regret
afterwards; but remember, most of us feel that this guilt and regret in itself is
insignificant and transient. I wonder as well, in our culture, how much the
guilt and regret after abortion is almost a normal emotion.
I seriously doubt whether liberalization of the law would reduce the
incidence of serious post abortal illness, which, even if uncommon, can be
serious and can lead to suicide, as in the puerperium. This I believe to be
largely determined by the premorbid personality or psychiatric vulnerability of
the woman before abortion. Unless all abortions are screened psychiatrically
some vulnerable cases will be missed, and a prophylactic opportunity is lost.
I believe that there are many women who will continue to resort to
illegal abortion under a modiﬁed legal system as has now become law in the
United Kingdom, either because they will be rejected for therapeutic abortion
under the law as it apparently stands, or because of their need for secrecy or
refusal to have their pregnancy made public. This would be much more of a
problem in unmarried women.
In assessing the sequelae of abortion it is important to look at the
beneﬁts to the entire family unit, both now and in the forseeable future.
Many psychiatrists believe that environmental factors and family atmosphere
are vital to the personality development of every growing child, and this
makes one reluctant to encourage the birth of children into what psychiatrists
call a pathogenic home environment. Many psychotic and grossly neurotic
mothers are pathogenic, we feel, towards their children; and any woman who
does not want her baby, even if she changes her mind later, can become a
pathogenic mother because of conscious and unconscious mental processes
relating to pregnancy. It is interesting to speculate as to how many youngest
children in many families would be in this world today if our abortion laws
were more liberal, especially the youngest by many years in a family. I say
this because some psychiatrists believe that a youngest child in a family,
particularly if the youngest by many years, is rather more vulnerable to
nervous illness in later life.
Finally, it is salutary to me as a psychiatrist, in seeing and assessing
women for therapeutic abortion under our current New South Wales law, to
remember the number of them I have seen who, as a result of discussion,
mobilizing social resources, and offers of psychiatric assistance, have happily
decided to continue in their pregnancy and proceed to term with no
subsequent psychiatric sequelae. I like to think all doctors can respect a
woman’s need to decide finally on abortion herself but be able to advise them
objectively on this; but overall I think this is just wishful thinking.
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MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF ABORTION : AN OBSTETRICIAN’S VIEW
Dr A. H. Bradﬁeld*
First I must thank the Institute of Criminology for the opportunity to
participate in this seminar. I must say that Mr Roulston seems to be a
master of the ambiguous phrase, because when writing to me and giving me
the topic for this particular presentation, “The Medical Problems of
Abortion”, he was kind enough to refer to my “wide experience”.
The whole problem of abortion is, of course, shot through ‘with
ambiguities and inconsistencies and ambivalances, particularly for doctors.
Doctors seem just as confused as anyone else about abortion, and the number
of letters to the medical press, in the last twelve months particularly, is ample
testimony to this.
We have heard from Professor Cross what the law has to say about this,
or, particularly in this State, what it does not have to say. But what about the
practice? Abortion enters obstetrical and gynaecological practice usually in
one of three ways: either the need to consider, and perhaps perform, a
therapeutic abortion; or in the form of a patient who is suffering from
complications after an illegal abortion; or as a request from a patient who has
an unwanted pregnancy that she wishes to be terminated.
I should like to speak first about therapeutic abortions. It is quite clear
that there obstetricians really haven’t got a leg to stand on. There is, in a
word, absolutely no provision in the law in this State for terminating
pregnancy. But of course, as we all know, the practice is quite different. The
subject of medical ethics and medical jurisprudence was never one that seemed
to me to be taken particularly seriously in undergraduate teaching — certainly
it was overshadowed by other subjects — but I nevertheless retain an
impression of three points.
The first is the one to which Professor Cross has alluded, the Crimes Act
of New South Wales, which said quite clearly what was unlawful. But it has
always been inferred, or there has been speculation, that because it prescribed
clearly what was unlawful, after all, lawful termination might exist.
Then, if I recall, some note was also taken of the Infant Life
Preservation Act of 1929 in Great Britain. This Act recognizes the right of a
child to independent existence, but it does permit the interruption 'of
pregnancy if it is done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the
life of the mother.
And then again great store was placed on a third point, and this was Mr
Justice MacNaughten’s summing up in the case of R. v. Bourne. This
immeasurably broadened the ﬁeld for therapeutic abortion, at least in Great
Britain. It at one step allowed psychiatric indications as being valid for the
termination of pregnancy.
* M.B., B.S., D. 0.0., M. R.C.O.G., Honorary Obstetrician and Gynaecologist,
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Sydney.
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Inﬂuenced by all these, there has grown up in this State a practice
which has gone on for long enough to be called traditional. It has never been
challenged nor, I imagine, is it ever likely to be challenged, and in practice the
obstetrician feels reasonably free to act in what he considers to be the best
interest of the patient. If he feels that the continuation of her pregnancy is
detrimental to her physical or mental welfare, and if he has his opinion
conﬁrmed by a colleague of what is technically termed “standing”, he would
then induce an abortion. Very rarely is he confronted with a situation where
the patient’s life hinges on his decision. Mostly, cases are "borderline and
involve specialist consultation, perhaps admission to hospital and careful
laboratory assessment of the particular problem that may perhaps be held to
indicate a therapeutic abortion.
I should like to illustrate the practice in this State, that we have already
heard a little about from our Chairman, by showing you some ﬁgures from
one of the large obstetrical hospitals in Sydney, which I don’t think supplied
ﬁgures to Mr Roulston. This hospital is certainly not in the van, but neither is
it to be numbered amongst the least.
The ﬁrst slide shows the number of therapeutic abortions performed
year by year in the period 1962 to 1967. These are contrasted with the total
number of confinements. You will see that the number of conﬁnements has
remained relatively static (approximately 4,500) and so, too, really, has the
number of therapeutic abortions. In 1962 there were rather more than in
most of the other years. These, as I will show you later, were
disproportionately due to psychiatric indications, but this was entirely by
chance, these ﬁgures have no statistical signiﬁcance. The vintage year of 1962
happened to coincide with a rubella epidemic, and this is why the ﬁgures are
inﬂated over and above the others. But by and large you can see that they
have remained remarkably constant.
The indications for these (and the total number was 62) are broadly
divided up into medical, surgical, psychiatric, foetal indications, social, and
eugenic. These categories are by no means mutually exclusive.
The medical indications were, as you see, for heart disease, renal disease,
tuberculosis, diabetes, and what might be called medical malignancy, that is to
say, where there was no question of surgery being involved.
The surgical indications were a crippling bilateral arthritis which
prevented the patient from walking and had grossly deformed her pelvis, and a
surgical malignancy — it was a cancer of the cervix where pregnancy
coexisted.
The 16 psychiatric indications (reactive depression and schizophrenia)
were in these instances primary, but there were certain psychiatric overtones
to some in other groups.
The foetal indications were almost exclusively those of rubella. Only 2
of these 20 were performed for Rh incompatibility. Rhesus incompatibility is
one complication of obstetrics which is rapidly disappearing because of the
ability now to prevent sensitization occurring. It is likely that this will soon
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disappear entirely from what have been held to be valid indications for
therapeutic abortion.
Rubella is worth saying a word about. This is something of a paradox.
Rubella in the ﬁrst three months has constituted one of the commonest
indications for therapeutic abortion, and the prospect that a child may be
mentally or physically abnormal can certainly be a valid indication for
termination if fear of this happening has an adverse psychological effect on
the mother. Of course, in theory, consultation should always be held with a
psychiatrist to assess this adequately, but in practice this seems not by any
means always to be done. If the rubella is properly documented, and if the
mother expresses some concern, an obstetrician will usually only have his
opinion endorsed by another obstetrician.
The social indications were only quasi-social. This is one case where
psychiatric factors played a very important role as well.
The,eugenic indications were, as you might expect, serious deformities
likely in the children of the particular mother, or where there was serious
incidence of hereditary disease.
The techniques used in performing these therapeutic abortions are of
interest too. Most of them were by dilation and curettage of the uterus, and
this reﬂects the fact that terminations are usually done quite early in
pregnancy. The operation of hysterotomy is one where the abdomen is
opened and the uterus is incised and its contents evacuated through an
abdominal incision. This is done where the pregnancy has progressed beyond
(on the average) 12 to 14 weeks, and where an attempt toemptythe uterus by
curettage would be extremely hazardous. Total hysterectomy, which seems a
rather radical way of terminating a pregnancy, was done in 2 of these 62 cases
because there was coincident uterine pathology that demanded treatment in
its own right although it wasn’t primarily a factor in deciding for the
therapeutic abortion. In 22 of the 62 cases sterilization was performed at the
same time. ~
These techniques are not, of course, the only ways of performing
abortions. In Scandinavian countries in particular, abortifacient pastes are
used. When introduced through the neck of the womb into the lower part of
the womb, these have an«irritating effect and induce the uterus to contract
and expel its contents. But these were not used in this series and they are
very little used in the United Kingdom or in British Commonwealth countries
generally.
One technique which has not yet made its appearance in Australia, but
which certainly will make a medical impact, is a form of suction apparatus
combined with an electro-mechanical vibrator. There have been glowing (if
that is the right word) reports in the Eastern European literature about the
ease and facility of this technique, so much so that it is being done (if one
can believe this) on an outpatient basis attended by only minimal pain,
indeed, only discomfort, and minimal blood loss. This is certainly something
that needs to be taken note of. The apparatus, this electromechanical
vibrator, apparently speedily dilates the cervix and allows the sucking
apparatus to be introduced through the cervix and the whole contents of the
uterus to be sucked out through the tube in vacuum cleaner style. One
Russian refinement also incorporates a rotating screw that manages to, as it
were, mince the material that is removed.
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The last slide that I want to show you has, again, no statistical
signiﬁcance. It is just to show you that no notable religious group was exempt
in this 1962 group of patients on whom therapeutic abortion was performed.
Mr Roulston has already indicated the wide differences in the
application and interpretation of this practice of therapeutic abortion. This is
perhaps even more strongly highlighted by a letter which appeared in the
British Medical Journal about three weeks ago written by Dr MacLaren from
Birmingham. He was writing about somethingquite different, but in the course
of his letter he referred to the difference between two Scottish cities,
Aberdeen and Glasgow, both of which undoubtedly offer a very high standard
of ethics and obstetrical care. In Aberdeen, where there is a School very
conscious of socio-economic factors, it seems that 1 in 50 pregnancies end in
therapeutic abortions, whereas in Glasgow 1 in 3,750 do. He makes'the
comment that without doubt (I wouldn‘t know if this is true or not, but I
give it to you for what it is worth) social and economic pressures in the slum
areas of Glasgow overshadow those of Aberdeen.
But even here the same sort of variation is certainly seen. The Abortion
Act of the United Kingdom is making a considerable impact in this country. I
think that this seminar tonight is evidence of that, and it is going to stimulate
increasing interest about our position here. I think, therefore, that it is
.worthwhile commenting, from the doctor’s point of view, on some of the
provisions which have concerned the doctors in the United Kingdom and
which may come to concern us here.
We have already mentioned the egregious omission of rape, and I would
certainly endorse that from the personal point of view. I feel that this most
certainly should have been included.
The second point which has concerned doctors in England has been the
interpretation of what is called the “conscience clause” —— the ability for a
doctor to object on conscientious grounds. Some consultants, it seems, have
imagined themselves involved in a court action because they have refused to
terminate a pregnancy in a patient who has been sent to them by another
practitioner. It would seem that this is probably a groundless fear. The
Medical Defence Union of Great Britain, who have had this question referred
to them for an authoritative answer, although it has not yet been tested in
law, feel that quite apart from the doctor’s rights under the conscience clause
the gynaecologist is under no obligation to terminate a pregnancy if in his
considered clinical opinion the operation is not necessary.
Another point is the impression that termination may be permitted on
social grounds alone, thus opening the ﬂoodgates virtually for abortion on
demand. In this context I think that it is well worth noting that social factors,
even in the situation of the practice here in New South Wales, have always
been taken into account, and rightly so, when assessing the impact of
pregnancy on the health of the mother. One obvious and telling example of
this is heart disease in the mother. It is important to consider her housing,
her age, the size of her family, what domestic help she has. All these things
bear on the prognosis of her heart disease and therefore will have some
bearing on the functional capacity of her heart. Returning to the impression
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that some people have of termination on social grounds alone, this misgiving
seems to have arisen from the provision that permits the practitioner to take
account of the woman’s actual or forseeable environment. In theory this has
been answered by pointing out that the test is whether there is risk to the
health, be it physical or mental, of the woman herself or of any existing child
in her family. The test applied is the risk to health, but yet in practice there
may be some reason to feel concern about this clause.
Again, Dr MacLaren mentions in his letter of three weeks ago, and I
quote him, “Already, and remember the Abortion Act became law on April
27th in the Midlands, hospital and private abortion practice are in
competition. A telephone number is freely available in Birmingham to a
so-called social worker, who in turn will pass on the name and address of a
‘synipathetic’ doctor. This private group, headed by the local group of the
Abortion Law Reform Association, also plans a private ‘abortorium’ with
surgical sfaff imported from another city on a fee for service basis”. It
remains to be seen whether a writ will be issued against Dr MacLaren by
the Chairman of the Abortion Law Reform Association.
The last point that is concerning doctors, and one of the most
important ones perhaps, is the question of increased demand. This is very real,
and already it is happening, as again letters testify. It seems that up to three
times the number of requests for terminations are already being made in
hospital outpatient departments, and this certainly may well lead to
difficulties in priorities and could very easily prove an embarrassment to
hospital resources that are already strained. There may be very real difﬁculty
in deciding who should have the priority —— the patient for an abortion (who
of course should be aborted as early as possible after the decision is
taken, because it becomes increasingly complex and hazardous the longer the
pregnancy goes on), or the patient for investigation for some obscure, and
perhaps quite important, gynaecological condition, or the patient who is
simply waiting for 'non-urgent elective surgery which may well make a
contribution to her well-being.
I would like to turn now to a consideration of the complications of the
technique itself. I am sure that no one has a livelier awareness of the
depredations of the back-street abortionist that the obstetrician, because he
has to deal with the results, both immediate and remote. There is reason to
believe that in Sydney at least back-street abortionists are becoming fewer
and fewer. It would seem that illegal abortion in Sydney has been put on a
very highly sophisticated basis. There seems to be sound pre-operative
assessment to determine what can be done safely. There seem to exist
facilities which differ, reputedly, very little from hospital operating theatres,
general anaesthesis is very commonly provided, there is operative expertise,
and there is a post-Operative f0110w-up of sorts. This probably leads to a
low complication rate. But complications nevertheless do occur. The reason
that I want particularly to stress complications is that there is unfortunately
a tendency to regard induction of abortion as a trivial operation free from
risk. Those without specialist knowledge (and this certainly does include
some members of the medical profession) are influenced in adopting what
they choose to regard as a humanitarian attitude to abortion by a failure to
appreciate just what is involved.
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I don’t want to weary you with a lot of statistics about the incidence of
complications. In any case, many of them are suspect, as has already been
indicated. A not unreasonable starting point might be to quote some of the
Scandinavian figures, since there has been something approaching legalized
abortion there and relatively freely available abortion exists. The operative
mortality initially varied from 0.9 to 3.5 per 1,000 cases. More recent figures
from Denmark are lower, about 0.7 per 1,000. But this nevertheless is about
three times as high as the present maternal mortality rate in England and
Wales. This maternal. mortality rate includes septic abortions as well as
those complications of later pregnancy. In more recent Danish figures, a
non-fatal serious complication rate of not less than 3 per cent seems to exist
with legalized'abortion, and abortions there, remember, are done under
optimal conditions by people presumably skilled. One certainly would need to
dissect these on the basis of techniques, but I think there is some validity in
the ﬁgures nevertheless. Morbidity rates’ of up to 15 per cent are also
reported. I haven’t seen any really convincing incidence ﬁgures about long
term sequelae. These are certainly real, but one can only guess at them.
4
I think to meaningftu discuss complications ~ and again at the risk
of repetition I would stress that in any consideration of abortion one can’t
feel that one is discussing it fairly and completely unless one has some
understanding of the techniques — I would like to mention a few points in
operative techniques which do have a bearing on it.
I would like to show you ﬁrst the surgical anatomy of the uterus. What
we are looking at in the first diagram is a section of the abdominal cavity and
pelvis taken directly through the midline. Here, right in the centre of the
field, is the uterus. You will notice that it lies immediately behind and above
the bladder, and immediately behind the uterus is the rectum. What is not
shown in this ﬁgure are multiple loops of small and large bowel that are in
relation to the uterus lying above, beside and in front of it. The ﬁgure below
is a section taken a little to one side of the midline so that the midline organs
of bladder and uterus are not cut in half so to speak. The relations here are
no less important. Running down beside the uterus in the two layers of
peritoneum are very substantial bloodvessels. This uterus is not, of course,
pregnant, but during pregnancy, with the enlargement of the uterus, there is
tremendous hypertrophy of these bloodvessels. They become very substantial
indeed. And this view, cut off here for convenience, is the ureter. This
conveys urine from the kidney down to the bladder. The ureter lies in close
relation to the side of the neck of the womb.
The standard technique of termination is by curettage, and this is done
usually within 6 to 8 weeks of gestation. Up to 10 weeks it is relatively safe,
12 weeks becoming a bit hazardous (even experts in this technique would feel
a certain reticence in doing it at 12 weeks) and it would rarely be able to be
safely attempted above that period of gestation. I am not suggesting that
obstetricians and gynaecologists approach this operation in fear, trembling
and great trepidation, but at least they approach it with a very lively
appreciation of what may go wrong.
f‘
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Here we are looking at the section of the pelvis with a pregnant uterus.
Now, the ﬁrst point is, of course, that the patient must be carefully examined
to determine the position of the uterus and its size, and it is important, too,
that the bladder be empty. If this is not empty it not only hampers a proper
assessment but it also makes it more liable to damage. The dilation you see is
going on here; there is an instrument gripping the anterior lip of the neck-of
the uterus and a dilatator is being introduced. Dilatators have to be
introduced very carefully. If they are not, and they are introduced too
forcefully, perforation may occur. Not only may perforation of the uterus '
occur, but a ring of muscles that lie at the junction of the neck of the uterus
and the body of the uterus,.and on which the integrity of pregnancy largely
depends, may be ruptured. This produces no ill effects at the time, but it
predisposes to a characteristic type of spontaneous abortion which occurs in
the middle three months, and later, when the patient may be having a wanted
pregnancy, then she may, without warning, abort, and consistently abort at
about that time because of trauma sustained long before.
The next step after dilatation is to loosen and remove, by means of a
curette, the contents of the cavity of the uterus. This has to be done with
extreme delicacy of touch, because it is an operation which is largely done
blindly and with tactile sense. It also has to be done with controlled speed,
because there is inevitably a certain amount of bleeding, and sometimes, if the
pregnan is advanced to 12 weeks or so, considerable bleeding. It is not by
any means difﬁcult for the curette to perforate a uterus. Now, remember the
relations of the uterus: a curette may perforate the uterus and may involve
the big bloodvessels lying along the uterus itself, and this can produce
torrential haemorrhage that may even require hysterectomy for its proper
treatment. The bowel itself may be perforated, and this will of course result
not only in damage to the bowel but in the dissemination of highly infective
contents into the peritoneal cavity, a faecal peritonitis, and quite possibly
death. The bladder may be perforated. and this will result, until it is surgically
g closed, in a permanent passage, the bladder never ﬁlling up, and the constant
drainage of urine through this hole made into the bladder.
It is not impossible for the whole of the lining tissue of the uterus to
be removed, not merely the pregnancy itself, so that the patient may never
again have another period. — Nothing is left but the muscular wall and a
thin layer of ﬁbrous tissue covering it. It is by no means uncommon for
adhesions to develop in the cavity of the uterus, and these cause the walls
to adhere. Depending on the extent to which this happens, the patient may
have scanty periods and not be able to conceive, or no periods at all,
because the whole cavity is obliterated by adhesions.
The next step involves using a pair of forceps to grasp some of the
fragments of tissue and remove them, fragments that have not been entirely
removed by the curette. This may also, if a perforation occurs, result in a
loop of bowel being drawn down. You probably all remember a case not so
very long ago from Newcastle where a considerable amount of bowel was
withdrawn and the doctor dealt with the situation by cutting it off. Even if
there is no perforation, it is by no means impossible for a portion of the wall
of the uterus to be removed by the forceps, leaving a permanent deficiency, a
weak spot. There are no consequences at the time perhaps, but in a
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subsequent wanted pregnancy this will be an area of weakness which may
rupture during the course of the pregnancy or is particularly likely to rupture,
with disastrous consequences during labour itself. All the fragments of the
conceptus have to be removed, because the fragments that remain not only
can be a cause of further persistent bleeding, but since they are dead tissue
they will form a perfect nidus for bacterial infection.
Perhaps the most serious complications of all are the infective ones.
Infection can result not only from fragments remaining and becoming
infected, but also from infection being introduced at the time. Infection of
the lining of the uterus, spreading through the wall may involve the peritoneal
surface immediately adjacent, with the result that an abscess may form. The
tube, of course, may become infected and as a result permanently blocked,
with inescapable sterility to the patient. Pus dripping out of the tube may
~ form an abscess in the pelvis which will require surgical intervention and may
result in the formation of quite serious adhesions in the pelvic cavity. There
may be inﬂammation in the veins, as you see illustrated on the far side of
the diagram, inflammation that will spread to involve larger and more
serious veins and result in quite serious and permanent incapacity.
The last picture is just one brieﬂy to show you what is involved in an
abdominal hysterectomy. On the left hand side we can recognize that there
has been an incision made in the abdomen, and you are looking at the uterus
lying underneath the abdominal wall which has been opened and the foetus
removed with the cord still intact and the placenta and membranes still intact.
Paradoxically, this operation is not attended by quite as many complications,
but this operation nevertheless leaves a scar in the uterus, a potential weak
spot, which in a subsequent wanted pregnancy may be liable to rupture.I
know it is very easy to overstress the complications, but until we get more
precise evidence of their exact incidence I do feel that this is something which
has always to be taken into account in any thinking or discussion about the
subject.
I said at the outset that doctors seem as uncertain as anyone else about
abortion. As far as I am aware, there has been absolutely no sampling of
medical opinion yet in this country and, as Dr Vickery pointed’ out, there has
been no professional association that has yet seen fit to make any deﬁnitive
statement about it. Now, Professor Cross in his paper did ask a very pertinent
question, and one which Dr Vickery also touched on. Professor Cross
wondered whether it would continue to be medically unethical to perform
abortions at the request of the patient if such abortion on request were
legalized. I would like to finish by giving you what I think ought to be the
reply. I feel that it would still have to be regarded as unethical. The
doctor’s prime responsibility is always to his individual patient. The doctor
must be regarded as the best judge of treatment which would be in the
interest of the patient’s mental and physical health. The patient herself is in
no position at all to assess the dangers and the results of any operative
procedure, including termination of pregnancy. I agree with Dr Vickery that
it would be entirely contrary to all accepted surgical practice for a patient
to decide when an operation should be necessary.
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Australian abortion laws will change radically and become much more
permissive within the next few years. Narrow deﬁnitions of “health”, mental
or physical, will be followed by broader ones and socio-medical indications.
As the line between the “medical” and the “social” will continue to be
further blurred, it will no longer matter much whether indications for a legal
abortion are socio-medical or plainly social. The laws are unlikely to sanction
elective abortion but in fact we shall be moving towards this as a de facto
policy.
      
  
     
Maybe around the late seventies, governments all over the world will
begin to intervene, indirectly by various disincentives, directly by law if need
be, as to the number of children a couple can have. There will be an uproar
about compulsion in which J. S. Mill, Hart, and the Griswold case will be
cited. Learned books and articles will defend “the right to reproduce” — from
the ﬁrst moment of marriage. The slogan now used to advocate elective
abortion — “a woman’s body is her own” - will be used to defend elective
childbirth. Developed countries will actively promote and endorse the very
latest in contraceptives, a large number of underdeveloped ones — including
those still nominally Catholic — will endorse and promote abortion.
      
  
  
      
  
  
A LOST BATTLE
Those who want abortion law reform in this country have already won,
without anything in the nature of a major local battle. They still feel
beleagured, but they are mistaken. The forces opposed to change, which
seemed so powerful and wellentrenched only yesterday and which are still
seen as such by most people, are in fact very weak. They will fight rear-guard
actions, but they will lose. They will lose without knowing what hit them.
       
   
    As a political force in fields which are widely perceived as “moral”, theChurches are no longer to be taken seriously. They are unable to function as
effective interest groups or to deliver the votes when it comes to the crunch.
This was shown over the uniform divorce legislation and, more recently, at the
state level in Victoria and South Australia over gambling and drinking issues.
The advice of the Churches is being increasingly ignored over contraception,
and it will be ignored over abortion.
   
    
  
    Don’t let’s be fooled by gazing with fascination — of horror or of joy —at what a single police inspector can do and is doing in Melbourne. Consider,
rather, these points: 
*M.A. (Melbourne), Professor of Government, University of Sydney. 
 \
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l. Abortions cannot be stopped. It is possible to control how -abortions
will be performed and it is possible, in principle, to stop professional
abortionists. No modern society in fact is willing to invest the resources
necessary for the latter objective. The de facto consequences of abortion
laws are that they shift the method of abortion — from the ofﬁcial to
the illegal, and, at times from the illegal termination induced by a
doctor to one induced by a quack. They are powerless to do anything
to deter self-abortions. They are powerless because in order to make
even an attempt to do so seriously the government would have to set up
a huge apparatus of control, maximize the .number of informers,
break down all notions of privacy and impose the most severe
punishments'on women.
In most countries there is not even an attempt to prosecute the woman,
or where there is one from time to time — as in France — the woman is
let off with a suspended sentence. Self-induced abortions, whatever the
formal legal position, are hardly ever treated as criminal or illegal
activities.
Those who stand for the status quo are on the defensive. The mass
media, especially television, are increasingly in sympathy with reform
arguments and attitudes. No major or even minor interest group these
days advocates that laws against abortion should be strengthened. The
polls and surveys do not usually ask questions about tougher law
enforcement let alone about tougher laws. These have been excluded by
tacit consensus as serious alternatives from the spectrum of possible
public policies.
The gentlemen’s agreement between the police and those abortionists
who are registered medical practitioners of course breaks down from
time to time — when there is a death, or when someone decides on a
blitz. But it is the norm and of very long standing. It cannot be
entirely explained in terms of corruption. In part, it means that
under-staffed police forces put the “suppression of abortion” very‘ low
in their order of priorities, if it ﬁgures there at all.
The most recent battle over reform was in England. The specifically
Catholic bodies were unable, and some of them were unwilling, to
mobilize much support. At a late stage a counter-organization to
combat the activities of ALRA — the Abortion Law Reform Association
— was set up. It was SPUC — the Society for the Protection of the
Unborn Child, christened the Society for the Propagation of the
Unwanted Child by its critics. It was able to attract a few MP’s and a
handful of prominent gynaecology and obstetrics professors. There are
three relevant points about SPUC: (a) From the start it excluded
Catholics from its Executive, i.e. the moral theological arguments were
seen as a political handicap. (b) It went for a Royal Commission, but it
did not oppose Steel’s bill completely, nor was it opposed to all
abortion. (c) It had the support of the (London) Daily Telegraph and
partial support from The Times, but no other papers.
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One may argue about the language which Cardinal Heenan used to
describe the facts, but not about the empirical content of what he said:
“There has been a tremendous decline in the acceptance of the moral law. Who
would have believed it possible even 10 yearsago that in England an abortion bill
will go through almost unchallenged? How strange if only Catholics were to stand
up for the sanctity of life in the womb — as if being against abortion is,like ﬁsh
on Fridays, something odd the Catholics go in for,”l
5. Those who, like catholics, are Opposed to all direct abortion, have lost
out long ago. In most countries abortions to save the life of the mother
can be performed. Yet, not so long ago this and the alleged mother vs.
child dilemma were the centre of the debate. Then there began a shift
towards discussion of indications for abortion in terms of “mental and
physical health”. From the 60’s onwards — Thalidomide, Finkbine case
— the “deformed fetus” and “rape” began to be discussed more
frequently. The narrowly medical indications began to decline. Catholics
who had always maintained that many of these operations were not
necessary on purely medical grounds had a very hollow victory — for
the psychiatric indications began to be fashionable.
6. However, the most important behavioural indicator towards attitudes to
abortion can be inferred from what has not happened about lUDs — the
Intra-Uten'ne Contraceptive device, which comes in the shape of quite
pretty loops, bows and rings. Since 1966 IUDs have begun to be used
with some frequency especially in underdeveloped areas. By 1967 there
were 3 million insertions in Asia, 100,000 in. the Middle East, 150,000
in Latin America. The percentage of married women, aged 20—44, with
IUD inserts was: South Korea 17%, Taiwan 13% and Pakistan 3%. (lUDs
are less safe than the pill, with about 2—3% of pregnancies within one
year; retention rates after two years varied widely — from 43—65%).2
By 1968, two million insertions had been made in India, and the most
authoritative estimate of global insertions was “probably between
6,000,000 and 8,000,000 [women], or nearly one half the number of
women currently using oral contracep‘tives”.3 So far most of the
research on the method of action of IUDs has been on animals. At
present it is stated to be “unlikely that one mode of action or one
particular effect will be found common to all.”4
1. Catholic Weekly, 23.6.1966. I have not seen any detailed summary of the struggle
around .the English bill, but the earlier stages are well covered (in terms‘of pressure
group analysis) in John Barr. “The Abortion Battle", New Society, 232, 9 March 1967,
pp. 342—46. Perhaps the best indication of the weakness of the opposition can be gained
from the fact that its leader, Norman St John-Stevas did not even try opposition in
principle. He wrote that opponents of the bill “have made it clear that they would
welcome a moderate, well drafted reforming statute, based on full knowledge of the
facts." Letter in Times 11.7.1967.
2. W. Parker Maudlin, “Retention of lUDs: An International Comparison”, Studies in
Family Planning, 18 April 1967, pp. 1—12.
3. United States Food and Drug Administration: Report on Intrauterine Devices by the
Advisory Committee on Obstetrics and Gynecology, excerpt in Studies in Family
Planning, 27 March 1968, pp. 12—15, at [3.13.
4. Ibid.
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There is no agreement on how the lUDs work, 5 and that depending on
highly technical disputes as to technical — not popular — deﬁnitions of
“conception” and its relationship to nidation, it is possible to argue
that IUDs should be classed as abortifacients rather than as
contraceptives. It is also possible to argue that whether the conceptus is
destroyed before or after nidation is morally irrelevant and that if IUDs
cannot be classiﬁed as abortifacients then they should be seen as
“devices destructive of the conceptus and thus involving the moral
malice of abortifacients.”6
However, the Catholic Church to my knowledge has not made an
official statement on the point and there hasbeen no major organized
campaign by Catholics against IUDs as (being equivalent to)
abortifacients. Such a campaign presumably would have to centre
around the notion that in addition to the 25 million or so global
abortions per year, which are seen as feticides, there now exist some 6
million women who go in for feticide every time they have intercourse,
during which they would otherwise conceive.
The absence of a major campaign in the popular Catholic press seems to
me highly signiﬁcant. It foreshadows what will happen if and when the
(infamous) post-coital pill becomes available. In other words, moral
positions are rapidly being undermined -— so far as their impact on
behaviOur is concerned, at the very least —- by technical developments.
All this means that the opposition to abortion is being constantly
weakened.
RATIONALITY
The history of abortion, of comparative legal and religious attitudes
toward it, and of the abortion-law reformers remains to be written. To be of
real value, it would have to be considered in connection with the history of
infanticide. Leaving aside here the question of moral distinctions between the
two, if any, the point is that at least in some societies it might be proﬁtable
to extend the “backstop” analysis to infanticide: abortion can be viewed as
a “backstop” when contraception does not take place or fails; infanticide
might be worth analyzing both as an alternative to abortion and as a
“backstop” when abortion is not available or when it fails. Thus in some
countries for some periods an analysis in terms of substitutions might be
profitable. Two of these might be Japan and Australia: in Japan at least
part of the recent story is one of legalized abortion being forced on the
government and part of the explanation of its widespread acceptance would
possibly lie in its replacing infanticide which historically was widespread.
(To a much more limited extent this may also apply to Poland.) In Australia,
there are gruesome stories of infanticide and of baby-farming, especially
towards the turn of the century. As far as I can see at the moment from
about the 1880’s onwards illegal abortions were in fact partly substitutes for
infanticide.
5. As the FDA. report puts it coyly: “Adequate data is still unavailable to answer
several basic scientific and clinical questions related to the intra-uterine devices. Research
support should be provided as follows: 1) to elucidate the mechanism of action of the
intrauterine devices . . ." Ibid., p.15.
6. Thomas J. O. Donnell, S. J. “Current Medical-Moral Comment”, The Linacre
Quarterly, 32(1), February 1965, p. 60.
|———_*i.
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These are admittedly very speculative remarks. To return to my theme:
I would like to suggest that, if we are willing to assume that the acceptance of
moral codes is shaped in major ways by social development, we can begin to
understand why the traditional Catholic code has been unable to fix actual
behaviour, why its acceptance has declined. I am speaking here only of a very
small part of the globe, i.e. developed societies. I do not know enough of the
history of the others to say anything useful about them on this point.
My hunch is that we might look for a major part of the explanation —
there won’t be such a thing as “the explanation in terms of a single factor —
to Max Weber’s concept of rationality as a major distinguishing characteristic
of “modern” society. Weber’s notion of rationality is very complex. For our
purposes we need a rough-and-ready concept of heuristic value. We can, being
quite loose and being deliberately so, here think of rationality as any
calculating approach, concerned with costs vs. beneﬁts, and hostile to the
unplanned, the arbitrary and the unpredictable.
The ideology of the birth control movement as it emerged from the
1880’s onwards ﬁts well enough into a rationality map. It spread from the
middle and upper middle to the working class. It was closely tied to the
notion of controlling one’s (family) environment. Its characteristic emphasis
was control of the consequences of reproductive behaviour by mechanical
means. These means were assessed by such criteria as efficiency, cost, failure
rates per woman-hour, investment of motivation which was required, etc.
Given ambitions about raising living standards, no amount of hostility by the
medical profession and of horror stories about the disastrous medical effects
of birth control spread by doctors7, nor of opposition by Church and State8
seem to have been able to affect the direction of the general trend — which
does not mean that they had no effects on its speed or its mode of
manifesting itself in behaviour.
7. Alex Comfort, The Anxiety Makers: Some Curious Preoccupations of the medical
profession, London 1967, esp, ch. 2; Norman E. l-Iimes, Medical History of
Contraception, Baltimore, 1936.
8. In very different vein: John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A history of its
treatment by the Catholic theologians and canonists, Cambridge, Mass. 1965: Peter
Fryer, The Birth Controllers, London 1965. Noonan’s book is a superb piece of work
and a model of historical writing, its treatment consistently includes social data and it
is much more exciting and of much greater general interest than its subtitle would
suggest. If I had to name one work which shows how the history of such a topic
should be written, it is Noonan. Fryer is a well documented good journalist’s job, and
full of curiosa. I do not know of any work on the history of the positive law which is
comparative. For England, see Bernard M. Dickens, Abortion and the Law, London 1966;
for a symposium on current legal and medical and theological views, see David T. Smith
ed. Abortion and the Law. Cleveland 1967; for a Catholic View which includes extracts
from early legal codes — rather selective and with superﬁcial comment, but handy - and
an excellent 80 page appendix (in part II.) of ‘Statutory materials on abortion - the
United States and its territories’. see Eugene Quay, “Justifiable Abortion — Medical and
Legal foundations", The Georgetown Law Journal, 49 (2), Winter 1960, pp. 173—256
and 49 (3), Spring 1961, pp. 395—538, published in book form by the N.C.W.C.
Washington. The single most convenient summary (in German) of the formal legal
position on abortion in Europe, with major extracts from the relevant laws, is: Herbert
Heiss, Die Abortsituation in Europa und inaussereuropaischen Landern. Stuttgart, 1967
which also summarizes the data re numbers, morality, morbidity etc.
For anthropological data showing the almost universal prevalence of abortion, consult:
George Devereux,A Study of abortion in primitive societies, New York, 1955; George
Murdock, Social Structure, New York, 1949; Clellan S. Ford and Frank A. Beach,
Patterns of Sexual Behaviour, New York 1951.
For public policy aspects, apart from the standard works by Glanville Williams and
Norman St. John—Stevas (who deals with abortion in a much less impressive paperback),
see Edwin M. Schur, Crimes without Victims: Deviant Behaviour and Public Policy:
Abortion, Homosexuality, Drug Addiction, Englewood Cliffs, 1965.
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There is then a basic clash between a moral code such as the Catholic
one which proceeds from the assumption of ﬁxed moral natures, i.e. acts
which are, by their avery nature and without reference to their consequences
good or evil in themselves and a society in which a calculus of consequences is
a major strand.
Once individuals go in en masse for a calculus which ends with the
conclusion that under some circumstances abortion is “the lesser evil” then,
empirically, if you wish to minimize abortions you must discover the factors
which determine their calculus, or if you like their preference curves. Now
whatever those opposed to changes in abortion laws and interested in the
primacy of the moral point of view, as they see it, have done this is one thing
they never have done. The various proposals for “doing away with the
conditions which lead to abortion—-seeking” — ranging from tougher laws to
increased family allowances — have not been based on any serious research as
to the determinants of sexual behaviour. By and large there has been
exhortation on the one hand and a priori assumptions as to disincentives and
deterrants on the other. I am, of course, not suggesting that this ﬁeld is the
only one in which this has happened. (cf. the changing evaluation of
imprisonment.)
It is not always unfair to cite “extremist” statements for at times they
bring out the character of a doctrine much more clearly than more moderate
or less crudely phrased ones. My present central point — that the total
prohibition of direct abortion does not leave room for a calculus of any kind,
or, perhaps put better, does not allow for the concept of “cost” at all — can
be illustrated by Catholic statements of this kind:
“An innocent fetus an hour old may ‘not be directly killed to save the
lives of all the mothers in the world.” 9
Or: “It is preferable by far that a million mothers and fetuses perish than
that a physician stain his soul with murder.” 10
I do not wish to assert, a priori, that the approach to abortion in terms
of its being an inherently evil act can have no impact on behaviour. But it
would be extraordinary, granted my assumption that what types of morality -
people accept must be explained in terms of social and cultural factors in
their environment, if such a possible impact were widespread in developed
societies. Industralization —— Marx made this point long ago, but thought it
was uniquely tied to “capitalism”, which it is not — tends to dissolve ﬁxed
and static relationships and concepts. As an influence on behaviour, theories
based on moral natures of acts per se might be relevant in other kinds of
societies. Thus I am told that Ireland is fairly free from abortion. If that is so
one should investigate the facts to see what the special conditions under
which Catholic moral theology is empirically relevant as to abortion-behaviour
might be, and to see whether the Irish case is in fact an example of such
possible relevance.
9. Austin O’Malley, The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation, New York
1919, p.111.
10. Edwin F. Healey, Medical Ethics, Chicago 1956. p.196.
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From the angle of a social scientist, then, the key question is not so
much whether it is philosophically possible to divide acts into acts,
consequences and circumstances 1 1 nor to propound a philisophical critique of
the more subtle aspects of catholic position. lts complexities — the distinction
between direct vs. indirect abortion, the relevance, if any to the abortion issue
of theories of mediate ys. immediate animation, the issue of ectopic
pregnancies, or the status of terata (monsters)12— need not concern us here at
length.
Only two comments about them: First, 1 cannot recall any speciﬁc
discussion of self-induced abortion which is of course one of the most
frequent methods, especially among the poor, in the works I have read which
are largely those intended for priests or Catholic doctors. This is one
indication of the gap between mass behaviour and the way trained men
11. On this, see the interesting book by Eric D’Arcy, Human Acts: An Essay in
their Moral Evaluation, Oxford 1963.
12. For a useful summary of the most frequently cited statements by the Sacred
Penitentiary and the Holy Ofﬁce, the Encyclical of Pius X1 and the two allocutions of
Pius XII, see T. Lincoln Bouscaren ed. The Canon Law Digest, vol. 3, Milwaukee 1953,
pp. 669—70. The brevity of the early statements, between 28 November 1872 and 5
March 1902 is striking, as is the gap between 1902 and the Encyclical of 1930. Vatican
II refers to matter only in passing: “ . . .From the moment of its conception life must be
guarded with the greatest care, while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes."
Walter M. Abbott, S. J. ed.,The Documents of Vatican [1, London 1967, P. 256.
For texts on medical ethics, see e. g. McFadden, op. cit.; Edwin F. Healey, Medical
Ethics, Chicago 1956; Austin O’Malley, The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation,
New York 1919, esp. chs. 3, 5; and G. Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, St Louis.
For convenient collections of Papal teachings, see, Alvin Werth and Clement S.
Mihanovich, eds. Papal Pronouncements on Marriage and the Family, from Leo XIII to
Pius XII, 1878—1954, Milwaukee, 1955, and: The Monks of Solesmes, sel. and arranged,
Papal Teachings: The Human Body, Boston 1960. For a summary of moral theology on
procuring abortion, see H. Noldin, Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. 2, 33rd Ed., Innsbruck
1961, pp. 313—16; Henry Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, vol. 2, London 1935, ch.
6; for terata, consult; Austin O’Malley, “Human Terata and the Sacraments", ch. 6 in
Austin O’Malley and James J. Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, New York 1911. For
ectopic gestation which provided one of the few areas for some debate,'see the above
texts on medical ethics, also the discussion between Henry Davis, (“A Medico-Moral
Problem—Ectopic Gestation”, Ecclesiastical Review, 1927, pp. 27S—91,405—514) and
Patrick A. Finney, Eccles. Rev., 1928, pp. 54—71 and rejoinder by Davis, pp. 413—16.
For some aspects of canon law, see Roger Huser, “The Meaning of ‘Fetus’ in relation to
the crime of abortion", The Jurist, 8 ‘July 1948, pp. 306—22. For a full treatment of this
narrow topic, see his book The Crime of Abortion in Canon Law, The Catholic
University of America Canon Law Studies, No. 162, Washington 1942. For animation,
consult O’Malley, The Ethics. . . , ch. 3; Anon., “Abortion and the ~ Embryological
Theory”, Ecclesiastical Review, 1928, pp. 626-31 and the much more interesting and
live minority view by J. Donceel, “Abortion: Mediate v. Immediate Animation",
Continuum, 5(1) Spring,1967, pp. 167—71.
1 am indebted to Fr. Paul Duffy,-S.J. for references and for giving me access to the
library of Canisius College.
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visualize it which is so very typical of professionals, whether Catholic or
atheist. Second, if the Catholic Church should ever want to move away from
its complete moral prohibition of all direct abortion -— I am not suggesting
that it will do so, nor even that it should do so — it would not be hard to
make the necessary distinctions. They could then rest, perhaps, on the
distinction between mediate and immediate animation. Very crudely and
inaccurately: the Church has always been against all abortion, but it used to
make a distinction between stages of the development of the fetus which in
turn was tied to theories about the precise moment of animation. The
non-animated (unformed) fetus was distinguished from the animated (formed)
fetus for most of the history of the matter so far as the gravity of the offence
and the penalties, censures, and irregularities incurred were concerned. (This
was not the case between 1588—1591.) The relevance of the distinction began
to disappear after 1869 and it is now considered irrelevant by nearly all
theologians so far as its possible effect on the (i1) licitness of abortion are
concerned. But Fr. Donceel claims that a “slowly growing minority” rejects
the standard view13. It would be possible to move towards a different and
more permissive attitude towards abortion, but, if tradition is to be invoked,
only in the first six weeks. If this ever happened — it would bring the
Catholic position somewhat closer to that of Islam. For Islam, contraception
has always been licit, and the vast majority of its theologians and canon
lawyers take the position that abortion up to the fourth month is also licit.l4
Whatever future developments, it is safe to predict that the idea that the
application of the “natural law” is simplelS will decline. There are already
straws in the wind that this is 5016.
It is also possible that the whole way we look at this issue will be
radically changed if a cheap and safe “abortion pill” becomes available. This
would (a) considerably reduce the role of doctors and (b) make it impossible
to assert any kind of legal control which was effective. It would of course be
possible to legislate against such pills, but given that they are safe and cheap,
and that not all countries would do so, this would merely mean the creation
of smuggling and a black market.
13. Donceel (see note 12) at p. 167.
14. Olivia Schieffelin (ed. and comp.), Muslim Attitudes towards Family Planning,
New York 1967, pp. 4, 6, 8, 12, 43, 50, 77, 103, 132, 133. But Al—Ghazzali, considered
by some Islam’s greatest theologiah, seems to have condemned it from the moment of
conception while yet also distinguishing between “grades of existence" of the fetus which
he correlates, in four stages, with increased degrees of iniquity involved in abortion. ibid.,
p.58.
15. “In the light of the moral law, the simplicity of the matter [direct abortion]
leaves little more to be said.” Charles McFadden, Medical Ethics, 5th ed., Philadelphia
1961, p. 135.
16. Noonan, op. cit., William Birmingham ed. What modern Catholics think about
bb‘th control, New York 1964; Contraception and Holiness, London 1965; Illtud Evans
8d,, Light on the natural law, London 1965, esp. ch. 4; G. Egner, Birth Regulation and
Catholic belief, London 1966. '
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Law and Morals
There is the whole area of the distinction between legality and morality.
I must resist any temptation to traverse this here. It is sufﬁcient to point out
that in this ﬁeld Catholics have much more room for immediate ﬂexibility. As
far as I am aware there are a number of statements by people in authority as
to what the attitudes of Catholics and the Catholic Church towards legislation
of this kind should be in a pluralist society. But there is nothing, to my
knowledge,'which could be called an “ofﬁcial” position.If correctly reported
in the press, the position of_ the Rev. Robert F. Drinnan (a Jesuit priest who
is dean of the Boston College Law School) during an international conference
on abortion in 1967 may become more representative than it would seem
now. Father Drinnan “suggested that a better solution might be to repeal all
laws prohibiting abortion in the ﬁrst 26 (sic) weeks of pregnancy. After that
period of gestation, he said, the law should consider a fetus viable and
interference with it homicide. This would avoid giving the state the power to
permit selective destruction of life, which he said has been done for the first
time in Anglo-American law by states that have adopted the model penal law
code of the American Law Institute.”l7
Status of the Fetus
I have said nothing so far as to whether the fetus is or is not a human
being from the moment of conception. Although Catholics attach central
importance to this point I do not think one can say much about it. It seems
to me a conceptual issue and anyone even vaguely familiar with the long and
unsettled dispute in philosophy over the status of “being”, “individuals”,
“persons” and so on will know that there is no chance at all of this issue
being “settled”. To settle it one would first have to agree as to which type of
philosophy is to be “decisive” and such a notion seems to me plainly absurd.
We can use a number of deﬁnitions, and I will cite later the two surveys
I know of which show how some people answer this kind of question and
make it clear that there is no agreement. We can and do use different criteria.
It seems selfevident to me that if you are opposed to abortion law reform
and believe the status of the fetus from the moment of conception is an
important or even crucial part of your argument, you will choose appropriate
criteria which make the fetus, by stipulative deﬁnition, human from the
moment of conception. The same will happen for other positions — you will
pick other criteria. So the rabbits are put into the hat first and then pulled
out and this seems to me the case for any of the widely different possible
definitions.
17. New York Times 8.9.1967. cf. “The only alternative for those who desire to
change America’s present abortion laws is to have existing abortion laws repealed”,
he [Drinnan] said, adding that “such a repeal would not mean that the state approves of
abortion but only that it declines to regulate it.” But he suggested that legal protection
viable fetal life could be asserted after the pregnancy passes the first 26 weeks. Removal
of the question of abortion from the law, he argues, “neither concedes nor denies to
individuals the right to abort their unborn children. It leaves the area unregulated in the
same way that the law abstains from regulating many areas of conduct where moral issues
are involved." Detroit Free'Press 8.9.1967, cf. Newsweek 18.9.1967, p.69.
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It is sufficient to point our that if we consider the fetus as human from
the moment of conception, very little is in fact resolved. It certainly in no
way follows that if we kill it, as we do in abortion, we therefore “murder” it.
“Murder” is a moral or a legal or a moral-and legal term and there is nothing
whatsoever from stopping us from making the standard discriminations
between murder, manslaughter, justiﬁable homicide etc.
Moreover, there are all kinds of other decisions we must make about
whether a fetus is capable of having legal rights, and if so, which; about
whether it is capable of having moral rights, and if so, which; about how we
can resolve the clash between its rights and other rights we might care to
specify, and how to decide how wide the range of holders of these other
rights should be. ‘
One can empirically determine by survey, how the term fetus is used
and what given groups assert as to when its life as a human being starts. No
representative study on this exists, but there is an exploratory one.
Seventy-six graduate students in public health, from 7 special public health
ﬁelds,|were surveyed. Fifty-six were Americans, 35 were men and 41 women.
Open questions and probing were used, answers were coded independently by
two researchers. Signiﬁcantly, one response, that of a Buddist, proved
uncodable — he saw life as a continuity, with no “beginning”. The sample was
about evenly split between those who thought a human life begins before and
those who thought it begins after birth. Just above 1/3 thought it began at
conception.
“When does a human life begin?” Number %
Before conception , l 1
At conception 27 35
During the lst trimester 2 3
During the 2nd~3rd trimester 8 11
Before birth —50
At birth 10 13
At viable birth l3 l7.
Sometime after birth l3 17
N. A., uncodable 2 3
‘ 76 100
The respondents were asked to give their reasons for holding these
beliefs. These were much of the same kind as I have found by informally
asking this same question around Sydney. I reproduce only the most extreme
position at the upper end of the scale, for this a human lifé begins sometime
after birth. “1. When it starts to recognize and respond to environment. 2.
When it takes on recognition, relates self to environment. 3. When it starts to
develop personality, becomes socialized. 4. The soul enters the body sometime
after birth, and it becomes human. 5. Within the ﬁrst 24—72 hours after
birth; when it can live independently of mother and of artiﬁcial supports.”
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Two-thirds were very or fairly conﬁdent of their position, 1/3 showed
considerable uncertainty. There was discussion of the characteristics which
subjects considered most significant in deﬁning the growing new life as a
human life. Foci of primary and secondary deﬁnitions were extracted, and
abridged, they are: l. Spiritual or religious. 2. Biological growth process. 3.
Identified by others. 4. Psychological growth process. 5. Independent
existence. 6. Interaction with others. 7. Personal and social characteristics.
These foci were then related to the beliefs re the beginnings of life. As
expected, those who used spiritual or religious deﬁnitions (a minority) tended
to place the beginning of life earlier than those who employed psychological,
sociological, or cultural definitions. Biological deﬁnitions were spread, with
some stress on the early point of the scale.
Religion was closely correlated with deﬁnition — the major splits being
as follows: When the data were simpliﬁed between human life begins
“sometime prior” vs. “at or after” birth there was a fairly clear gap between
Catholics, Fundamentalists, and Moderates on the one hand versus Liberals,
Secularists and Jews on the other. However, if one looks at the list of all six
alternatives within the scale this gap, though it still exists, becomes much less
and disagreement within a given religion increases sharply.
Women tended to believe that a human life begins at an earlier point
than men, and focus more on biological growth. Only men picked
independence from the mother, personality, or sociocultural deﬁnitions.l8
If we had comparative national surveys of this kind combined with
intensive studies at the micro level we might be able to make some progress
on the empirical issue: What, as a matter of fact, is the relevance of holding
given beliefs about (the beginning of) human life to (a) abortion behaviour
and (b) social behaviour?
We have no data on this at all. If we hold other factors constant would
we ﬁnd that women who believe that human life begins with conception have
fewer abortions than those who do not? No one has any idea. It is of course,
since this debate is strongly ideological, possible to ﬁnd data or alleged data
that Catholics have pro rata higher abortion rates than non-Catholics. I do not
produce them here since they are based on very'peculiar or no sampling, and,
more important even, none of them has tried to hold all other factors apart
from Catholicism constant i.e., if they’re worth anything, which I doubt, they
might merely be disguised data as to social class or disguised rural-urban
differentials.
The sanctity of life
This argument can, like any other, be put in a stupid form so that a
single abortion somehow triggers off a radical fall in all-round respect for life.
But it need not be put this way. We can cast it in the form of a probability
statement: An ofﬁcial sanctioning of abortion — and I would accept on this
subject the hidden premise that if governments permit abortion many people
will conclude that they are not immoral — would increase the probability that
moral inhibitions against the destruction of other forms of life for reasons of
convenience would decline and would, in the long run, decrease the legal
protection afforded to such forms.
18. Andie L. Knutson, “When does a human life begin? Viewpoints of public health
professionals", American Journal of Public Health, 57(12), December 1967, pp.2163—77,
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If this were the case would it be a strong argument against more
permissive abortion laws? This would depend on what kinds of moral
prohibitions were in fact undermined, if any. If it were true that a given
legalization of abortion made legalization of euthanasia much more likely this
would not count as a good strong argument with many. (An unknown
proportion of those who favour one also favour the other.)'But say it could
be shown that respect for all forms of human life were strongly affected or
that there is a reasonable probability that it is likely to be. Say we concluded
that infanticide of healthy children would increase or was pretty likely to do
so, or more generally, that the murder rate of adults would go up this, surely,
would be a very strong argument against liberalizing abortion laws.
1 have never seen any evidence that this would happen or is likely to
do so. Most of the time, what is said simply assumes the issue in question
has been settled; it assumes not only that various kinds of what is called
“murder” are morally equivalent but also that they will be perceived as
such, and that people will act on this perception.
At the crude debating-point level ~simplistic assertions can easily be met
with equally simplistic replies. There is no obvious correlation between indices
so that a “soft” abortion policy entails or is empirically highly correlated with
less respect for life, while the opposite holds for a tough one. Stalin’s reversal
of the permissive abortion policy of 1920 came at the time of the great
purges, in 1936, and the 1955 reversal to great liberalization came at a time
when there was more “respect for life”. Abortion was made a capital offence
in Nazi Germany in 1943 and in Vichy France — a woman was hanged for it
in 1943.
At a more respectable intellectual level, take the most striking example
of how complex real life is and how the dogmas of religion and of standard
progressivism fail to note this. Read, re-read and ponder this extract from
page 9 of the official Yugoslav Health Workers’ Code of 1964:
“A health worker should regard abortion as biologically, medically, psychologically
and sociologically harmful. Corresponding to the principle of socialistic humanism
and medical knowledge, human life must be respected from its beginning. Therefore
the health worker should consciously endeavour to see that the true humanistic
privilege of maternity be valued above the privilege of abortion. His profession of
health worker obliges him to seek in every individual case the type of professional
aid which will best help the situation of the wife and the family. At the same time
his profession charges him to strive for such conditions in society that abortion,
because of planned parenthood, becomes unnecessary.”19
It is thus quite possible to (a) consider abortion harmful in all its
aspects, (b) maintain that “human life must be respected from its beginning”
and yet (c) accept what is considered as a transitional abortion policy as the
lesser evil.
19. M. Hren, I. Herak—Szabo and A. Mojic, “Abortion in Yugoslavia within the
Framework of the Themes of the Conference”, in: Sex and Human Relations,
Proceedings, Fourth Conference of the Region for Europe, Near East and Africa of the
IPPF. International Congress Series No. 102. Amsterdam 1965, pp. 89—92, at p. 91
Emphasis supplied. In Yugoslavia punishments for women who had abortions were
repealed in 1951, and the law was liberalized, to a limited extent, in 1962 and to elective
abortion in 1960 — a commission calls attention to contraception. In 1964 there were 37
legal abortions per 100 live births (150,000 abortions) and another 50,000 hospital
abortions. l
7 .
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The question Catholic moral theologians and others have asked seems to
me most important, and it can be asked in such a way that no assumptions
which are speciﬁc to a given creed are smuggled in from the start: What, as a
matter of fact, can we ascertain about the causal effects of illegal as compared
with legal abortion on those forms of “human life” about which we can reach
agreement that they are to count as forms of human life? Such would be my
preliminary formulation.
On this point, the standard progressives are much more to blame than are
the Catholics or others who prefer to think in mainly moral terms. True,
Catholics have not done their homework — they have not formulated their
objections clearly, nor have they stated what they would consider as evidence
which they would accept as refuting them. But in their defence it could be
said that if the issue is to be cast in empirical terms it falls outside the
province of moral theologians — though not of sociologists who happen to be
interested in moral issues, whether they are Catholics or not. However, it is
the standard progressives who here have fallen ﬂat on their face. For the
Catholic point can, quite clearly, be rephrased in such a way that anyone who
works in terms of costs vs. beneﬁts would have to take it seriously into
account. It seems to me quite obscurantist on the part of people claiming to
be empirically minded that they should casually dismiss this issue. It is a point
which might very well lead to a major entry on the “cost” side of the balance
sheet. Take the nearest analogy — divorce. It’s of course true that divorce has
not “destroyed” marriage as a social institution but would anyone seriously
claim it has had no major and discernible effect on various aspects of
marriage? So, I would think, with abortion: I find it very hard to take the
scare debating points seriously — but then many a post Vatican 11 Catholic
would not, either: “The emotional argument that abortion will necessarily
lead to mercy-killing, or euthanasia, is faulty”.20
But I ﬁnd it just as hard to believe that legalizing abortion would have
only effects I’d approve of or would have no major social effects at all.
Dangers
An argument which is pretty frequent and which, though in no way
speciﬁcally Catholic, is at times used by some Catholics is the point that
reformers have allegedly vastly exaggerated the danger of illegal abortions,
and, that if this is so, it weakens the case for legalization. It is of course true
that in such an emotional debate “horror” stories a-plenty are part of the
currency. I for one cannot assert that one side is much better than the other.
As to the problem as such: not all reformers rest their case on the danger
point; it need not be a part of their argument, though it often is. On the
20. “Thinking of Abortion?” Reign of the Sacred Heart 32 (12), December 1966,
pp. 20—21. In spite of its brevity this is a "very suggestive and worthwhile piece — it seeks
some clues to the question raised by the Rossi study why most Americans including most
Catholics, favour some form of legalized abortion. It wonders why the American bishops
have not made “a relevant statement — which would go beyond the customary ‘thou
shalt not’ by proposing a rational frame, in contemporary language, within which the
moral issue could be discussed and understood. But on second thoughts we are unwilling
to blame the bishops for any current lack of guidance. Moral theology has not done the
homework which must precede any worthwhile statement”. (p.21) It then drops the
standard term of “murder” in talking about abortion and makes some tantalizingly brief
suggestions as to why this “killing process” is “made acceptable” for many people. This
type of enquiry, which does not beg the question from the start needs encouraging. So
does discussion of Catholic views on the legality of abortion. See Michael Deakin
“Catholics, Abortion, and Pluralism”, Catholic Worker, 386, June 1968, pp. 9—11.
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factual issue, there are clearly huge differences between countries — what is
true for Chile (five times higher chance of dying from an illegal abortion than
a normal childbirth) or for Turkey (where 10,000 mothers die every year
through illegal village abortions and the maternal mortality rate through
abortion in Ankara is 5.7%, with 27% of those aborted becoming sterile21)
need not be true of Australia. For N.S.W. (1964), when criminal abortions
accounted for 5 of the 28 maternal deaths, it has been estimated that the
death rate from criminal abortion is about 0.3 per 1,000 abortions,
“compared with a rate of 0.28 per thousand deliveries excluding criminal
abortions.” If so then “in this state criminal abortion is not a lot more
dangerous than allowing pregnancy to terminate naturally.”22
I cannot accept the “danger” argument as a worthwhile one either for
or against legalization, unless it be made part of a general proposition and
comparative data on other operations are given. If this is done, and the
general principle of the role of the state in relation to medical dangers is
stated clearly, one might consider it a relevant argument.
Promiscuity
The argument that legalized abortion would “encourage” promiscuity
seems emotionally effective while being utterly worthless.
As a moral argument it is immoral and despicable since it appeals to
nothing but fear. Unless it is meant to assert that legalized abortion would
encourage both pre— and extra—marital intercourse, it is irrelevant for married
women who of course — at least in developed countries — form the vast
majority of those seeking and having abortions. If taken seriously, it would be
a much stronger argument against permitting contraceptives even for the
married lest they “encourage” promiscuity; Moreover, the argument assumes
that no moral distinctions can be made between typesof pre—marital and
extra-marital intercourse, a position on which there is much less consensus
than there used to be.
The argument is a very bad one, which might account for its frequency
and its powerful appeal.
The Doctors
My hunches about doctors are extremely speculative and are based on
what seems to be common to them as a group regardless of whether abortion
is legalized as in Eastern Europe and the USSR, or partly pemiitted, with
crucial bureaucratic restrictions, as in Scandinavia, or largely illegal, as in
Australia. (I have not been able to get anything on Japanese doctors so far.)
21. _ N. Fisek, “Planned Parenthood: Responsibilities of the State in Family
Planning”, in: Sex and Human Relations, Amsterdam 1965, pp. 197—200 at p. 199.
22. K. L. Collins, Quo Vadis 01mm, paper to St Thomas More Society and Guild of
St. Luke (Sydney), Sydney 1968, p.3. The best study comparing Pregnancy rates and
Death rates associated with Contraception, Pregnancy and Induced Abortion is now
(1970) Christopher Tietze, “Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion”,
Studies in Family Planning, 45. September 1969, pp. 6-8.
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It may be useful to recall the.global position in the early and mid 60’s.
The ﬁgures are, of course, guesswork but generally accepted.
Global abortion position — 1960’s 23
A. Total abortions p.a. approx. 25 million of wh
B. Illegal abortions approx. 17,428,(
C. Legal abortions
(a) Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and Japan
approx. 1,753,000
.(b) U. S. S. R. (1958—59)
approx. 5,829,000
In undeveloped countries, especially Latin America, the ravages are
incredible. The best studies exist for Chile — though even there only based on
those who come to the attention of hospitals, maybe 40% of all abortions:
50% of women surveyed had had abortion; of these 75% had had three or
more, with the highest incidence amongst the poor marrieds aged 25—29 with
3—4 living children. Abortions done by midwives (about 46%) had a 46%
complication rate, self-induced ones (about 25%) one of 66%. Death from an
illegal abortion was four or ﬁve times more likely than that in childbirth.
Material mortality due to abortion accounted for 40% of all material deaths —
it was 111 per 100,000 (vs. 0 —- 3.4 per 100,000 legal abortions in Hungary,
Czechoslavakia and Bulgaria, 1959—1964). 24
It is not possible to argue that medical warnings have no effect since
there is no control group of warned vs. unwarned. However, it is hard to see
them as a serious deterrent — women persist in having abortions and in
self—induced ones with gruesome instruments even where mortality is very
high.
I ,
In part, sections of the medical profession and the public health people
have simply overplayed their hand, especially in countries where de facto
dangers are much less. By giving the impression that illegal abortions must be
death dealing they have opened the door to the argument from personal
acquaintance based on a single case: “She seems all right, so why shouldn’t I
be.” In part they have not done much to popularize concepts such as
morbidity, nor have they managed to reach consensus on relative dangers.
There is no agreement in the literature on how, in a given country, legal or
illegal abortions compare in terms of various dangers with other operations or
with childbirth.
Moreover, what is perceived as a relevant risk depends of course on what
you’re aiming at and the medical costs of abortion must seem quite different
to a determined and desperate woman than they would be to a male doctor.
23. Calculated from table 4, in K. H. Mehlan, “Frequency and Mortality Rate
Associated with Induced Abortions on a Global Scale (an assessment)”, in: Fifth World
Congress of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, ed. Carl Wood and William A.W. Walters,
Sydney 1967, p. 804. About another 222,000 abortions in Eastern Europe are registered
in hospitals but not induced there, an unknown but probably high percentage of these
are illegal, the rest spontaneous. Figures for U.S. S. R. (no ofﬁcial statistics) from David
M. Heer, “Abortion, Contraception and Population Policy in the Soviet Union”, Soviet
Studies, 17(1), July 1965, pp. 76—83 at p. 81.
24. Mehlan, loc. cit. pp. 790, 799.
  
 Social Attitudes to and Moral Implications of Abortion 49
2. There has been much too much concentration on the exceptional cases
— rape, incest, a possibly deformed fetus, danger to life. By now four
American states — Colorado, North Carolina, Maryland and California —- have
passed more permissive laws on abortion, all based on grave impairment of
physical or mental health of the mother, substantial risk of grave physical or
mental defect in the child, or pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. These
are based on the 1962 model code of the American Law Institute. But it has
been estimated that if similar laws were passed in all American states — 25
were considering reform in April 196825 — only 15% of those abortions now
performed illegally could then be performed legally 26 . Besides, a legal
abortion costs round $US300.
BIRTH CONTROL
Nor does the spread of contraception offer, as many birth-controllers
used to hope, an immediate “solution” to the abortion problem. There is
increasing agreement that the earlier ideas of how contraception would spread
and how successful it would be are simplistic — they tended to neglect issues
of motivation. Work by Lee Rainwater and Stycos or Kingsley Davis has
shown that cultural factors are of great importance. There may or may not be
a “culture of poverty” but there is a “culture of contraception” — a point
made many years ago by the French Catholic, Fr. Lestapis. (He derived its
structure from a priori views and got it nearly 100% wrong but still ought to
get credit for the idea.) Generally speaking the point I made earlier in this
paper about rationality seems to be correlated with social class. The poor,
those in rural areas, and those discriminated against on grounds of colour are
less likely to behave in a rational manner — in the sense I’ve used the term —
than the relatively well off. This is a function of their environment, one in
which they are, and feel themselves to be, the playthings of fate and in which
they have, and feel they have, very little control over what happens to them. I
would like to suggest that, just as in the ﬁeld of political science, we have
found a close relationship between political apathy and feelings of
powerlessness so a similar relation exists in the ﬁeld of the control of the
consequences of reproductive behaviour.
How far away we are from eliminating all “accidents” and making, as
the cliche goes, “every child a wanted child” can be gauged from a report of
the latest survey by two leading US specialists, Professors Norman Ryder and
Charles Westoff. It shows that “of all the American couples who intend to
have no more children only 21% can be said to have enjoyed complete success
in controlling fertility”.27
25. Newsweek, 8.4.1968. See 1970 Postcript.
26. New York Times 10.9.1967.
27. Sun—Herald, 21.4.1968.
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A Protective Screen
It w0uld be foolish to blame doctors for concentrating, in so far as they
are interested in the abortion issue at all, on the exceptional cases. The same
point can be made about social workers who love the marginal “interesting”
case but are reluctant to say or do much about those who are just plainly
poor, or about academics who are willing to spend a good deal of time with
students “in trouble” but not do very much with the general run-of-the-mill
student. We are all in the same boat here: the concentration on the'
exceptional, dramatic and “hard” case acts of course as a protective screen..
Through selective perception we screen out the impact of the general mess
and keep our peace of mind or, if you prefer, cognitive balance.
Elective Abortion?
So it is hypocritical and smug to point the ﬁnger at doctors and ask
them to “face the real issue” — the plain fact that the huge majority of
women who want an abortion, 85% if the US guess can be generalized, have
none of the standard “indications” but simply do not want the child. This
became clear to me after reading my first few dozens of books and papers in
this field — just how many rapes leading to pregnancy were there —— the
chance of a single act ending in pregnancy being between 1:25 and 1:50
according to Tietze. How frequent was incestuous intercourse leading to
pregnancy, and so on?
To face the fact that this is the key issue about abortion is extremely
uncomfortable to say the least, and it is only in the last two or three years
that this point has started cropping up in the literature of the “respectable”
reformers. Till then it was very much a point made-by people dismissed as
outside the pale. However, I am pretty sure that this point — the “right to
have an abortion”, the agitation for the abolition of all laws prohibiting
abortions — can no longer be treated as marginal. At the September 1967
three-day international conference on abortion, which had all the “right”
status symbols -— jointly sponsored by the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation
and the Harvard Divinity School and held at the Washington Hilton Hotel —
Professor Louis B. Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
who helped to draft the A. L.l.’s model penal code put this rather coyly
when he said that adoption of the code “will not solve all the problems. Most
abortions are sought by married women who may have a number of children
and want no more, or by unmarried women over the ‘age of consent’, or by
married women who ﬁnd themselves pregnant after the husband has deserted
them or been killed, where the prospective mother faces the prospect of ‘
raising a fatherless child while working for a living.”28 Professor Schwartz, it
will be noted, starts with the main group but immediately proceeds to “hard
cases” to minimize the shock. Dr Christopher Tietze, of the Population
Council, who is generally considered as the top Western expert in this field —
Professor K. H. Mehlam being the “Eastern” one —— was more direct when he
said that “the vast majority of illegal abortions performed in the United States
involve a healthy woman wishing simply to head off an undesired
pregnancy.”29 ‘
28. Detroit Free Press, 8.9.1967.
29. Ibid.  
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There are very few things about abortion I feel can be stated with a
great degree of certainty, and simply — this statement is one of the few and I
am quite sure that it applies to this country. We do everything to hide this by
thinking and writing in terms of all possible “indications” for abortion, from
rape" to socioeconomic indications,all indications except that of: “I do not
want to bear this child”. The reason is of course that, especially since most of
debate is conducted by males, we feel that there must be some complex
“justification” for such a desire, that the preference as such is not sufficient.
Yet the whole issue of elective abortion will come to the fore. Earlier
this year the American Civil Liberties Union adopted elective abortion —
usually known as “abortion on demand” — as its policy and listed five civil
liberties which, it believed, all abortion laws violated. Since this statement,
though brief, is the best summary of this kind of approach and' since the
magazine which reprinted it 30 is not widely known in Australia, I reproduce
it as an appendix to this paper. .
Doctors have a fairly easy way of screening out the issue of “social
abortion”, let alone of elective abortion: they can adopt a narrow definition
of “health” e.g. the Oxford Concise one of “soundness of body” rather than
go for the broad W. H. 0. view of health as “a state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity”. The narrower one’s concept of health and of medicine, the easier
it becomesto see demands for social and elective abortion as an intrusion on
one’s proper field of work.
\
30. Current, May 1968, pp. 26—28. In the same issue (pp. 28—31) an article by Dr
Alan F. Guttmacher, president of Planned Parenthood — World Population and Visiting
Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Albert Einstein School of Medicine is
extracted (from his “When Pregnancy Means Heartbreak”, McCall’s, April 1968). His
essential points are: 1. Abortion on demand would “vastly reduce the army of neglected
and rejected children", cut by half the 300,000 illegitimate children born in US each
year. It would cut shotgun marriages which contribute heavily to the high divorce rate
among teenage brides. 2. It would almost eliminate illegal abortion “and thereby in large
part get rid of one of the many ﬂagrant practices that foment disrespect for law. It
would also reduce social, economic, and ethnic discrimination in an important segment of
medical care and protect the life and health of hundreds of thousands of women each
year.” In Hungary and Czechoslavakia “legal abortion imposes one-twentieth of the
maternal hazard of childbirth. Deaths from illegal abortion have declined over 80 per cent
in Hungary since the institution of abortion on demand . . . .” 3. It would cut the US
birth rate (18 per 1,000; population 'growth down from 1.7% in 1957 to 1%) and in
terms of “air pollution, water contamination, urban congestion, increasing
unemployment" this is still too rapid.
Guttmacher then deals with the arguments that abortion is murder; that it will change
basic human values; or that it has frequent undesirable psychic and physical reactions —
three points he considers unsound. But he opposes elective abortion “at least now for the
United States . . . .” His reasons:
1. At present polls show the public does not want it. But by 1975 state laws may
be liberalized, and then it is “likely” that “a safe, effective pill is discovered that any
woman can take on the 25th day of a menstrual cycle, whether or not she is pregnant,
[so that] the matter of repealing abortion laws becomes strictly an academic matter.” 2.
Elective abortion “reduces the necessity to use effective contraception, and as a physician
I feel it is better physically and psychologically to prevent pregnancy than to terminate it
through abortion.” 3. Elective abortion “relieves the male of all responsibility in the
sphere of pregnancy control.”
He believes the A. L. I. code is too restrictive and favours adding a number of social
indications.
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(To use sociological jargon which I’ve tried to minimize in this paper: A
narrow concept of health is functional for the maintenance of medicine as an
autonomous subsystem and helps to deﬁne the boundaries of such a
subsystem. A broader definition is dysfunctional from this angle.)
3. There is also the aesthetic aspect: abortions are of course always a
lesser evil, no one advocates them per se. They are an admission that birth
control has failed. They are crude, and normally do not require much skill.
They are monotonous operations. It is hard to see a specialist or any other
medico acquiring status through being a superb abortionist. (Compare
abortions and heart transplants.) Hence there is a fear by many doctors that if
they “give in” they will be swamped by requests, and that even though
elective or social abortion does not mean one has “a right” enforceable against
a particular doctor to have one’s pregnancy terminated it might in the long
run mean this. These fears are hard to assess, they are certainly not plainly
silly. It is all very well for outsiders to talk airily about liberalizing the law or
the rights of the woman — most of those who do so will never have to do an
abortion.3l
Moreover, abortion on demand is highly likely to lead to an
undermining of specific medical counter-indications, precisely because it will
raise the issue of what are “medical” counter-indications and who finally
decides this. True, in all Eastern European states which have elective abortion
there are medical counter-indications and also limits as to how late the
pregnancy may be terminated — usually it must be within 12 weeks — and
how soon you can have a legal abortion after the last one. But there is also a
complex appeal procedure in some of these countries against the judgment of
a given doctor.
31, Commenting on an abstract of a paper by H. Melvin Radman and William
Korman (Obstetrics & Gynecology 21, February 1963, pp. 210—225) dealing with
perforations (in hospitals) during D. & C. the editor of the yearbook comments: “Despite
the fact that d. and c. is considered a ‘minor’ operation and turned over to young
assistants, harm can result from it.” Comment by editor in P. J. Greenhill ed. Yearbook
of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 1963—64, Chicago 1964, p. 392. See the discussions in
1937, 1960, and 1961 whether it was advisable to do D. & C‘s in one’s private ofﬁce —
the main reason why this was thought inadvisable was not medical but fear of being
accused of doing abortions. Yearbook ed. Greenhill, 1957—58, p. 358; 1960, p. 368;
1961—62 pp. 384—5 (on procedure for office curettage). Cf. the comments by a Swedish
doctor, Dr Siovall that if abortion were on demand then since there exists “extreme
reluctance” of gynaecologists to do them “we would have to force a lot of
Gynaecologists to perform the operations against their will,. . .."; and the comment on
this point by Dr K. Miltenyi (Hungary) that it was not a personal issue - there are rules
in every state which do not depend on personal opinion, e.g. compulsory schooling.
“Discussion”, in Sex and Human Relations,. Amsterdam 1965, pp. 103, 104. A popular
but worthwhile book which deals with abortion in Britain and puts great stress on the
role of the doctors in carrying them out is Paul Ferris, The Nameless just re-published as
a Penguin.
The general point is that as long as there is any legal control (and there is some even in
countries with elective abortion policies), doctors have a de facto quasi-judicral or quasr-
administrative-tribunal function on this issue.
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4. I say nothing about the inﬂuence of medical ethics. The Hippocratic
Oath, two World Medical Association codes, and sometimes the UN
“Declaration of the Rights of the Child” of November 1959 are often cited. I
do not know what inﬂuence, if any, medical ethics has, what the ethical views
of doctors in fact are, and how they feel about the standard moral arguments
about abortion. (Their views as to legal indications for abortion are available,
and presented in Part B.) Presumably Japanese doctors feel differently from
Australian ones, but I have no material which enables me to go beyond the
standard platitude that “cultural factors are bound to be important.”
Part B
' THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC OPINION
What are the views of the public and of special groups on the
legalization of abortion? Since there are only two Australian surveys, I will
review other data I have. What is their relevance?
21. They have no determining force as inﬂuencing what I think I ought to
believe — I cannot speak for anyone else on this point.
b. They have no force in determining what Catholics should believe, their
Church not (yet) being run on Gallup Poll lines.. They do, however, show
whether claims by church leaders or the church press as to de facto Catholic
beliefs are true or false. With all the limitations of polling these views are
certainly more representative of Catholics as citizens than those which others
claim they have on a purely a priori basis. Hence ﬁgures of this kind may
contribute something to help Catholics themselves decide what their position
on abortion laws (as distinct from the morality of abortion) should be. It is
clear that many well informed Catholics who are anxious for “dialogue”
simply do not know to what extent the official Catholic position has become
unrepresentative of the actual beliefs of Catholics. Thus, a well meaning
Melbourne academic starts his article as follows: “Ofﬁcial Catholic spokesmen,
and without doubt a large majority of those for whom they speak, adopt a
hard line on abortion: abortion is no different in kind from murder, as the
foetus is, at all stages of its development, completely human.” 313.
I am sure that the writer is sincere in his beliefs about that “large
majority” -— but they happen to be false, as the evidence from surveys even
with all the qualifications made about it, clearly shows.
c. They have great force for the purposes of the criminal law if, but only
if, one broadly subscribes to the sort of View which differentiates between
morality and the law on the one hand, and, on the other agrees that there
should be ‘no criminal punishment except for “behaviour that falls below
standards generally agreed to by substantially the whole community” with of
course plenty of area for dispute as to what “substantially” means in terms of
survey percentage. I take it that no one would claim that it could mean less
than 51%, but as to how much more it should mean, there would be. the usual
debate.
31a. Deakin, op. cit., p.9.
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This point of view has been put nicely and brieﬂy by the American Law
Institute. Referring speciﬁcally to abortion it commented:
“The criminal law in this area cannot undertake nor pretend to draw the line where
religion or morals would draw it. Moral demands on human behaviour can be higher
than those of the criminal law precisely because violations of those higher standards
do not carry the grave consequences of penal offences. Moreover, moral standards
in this area are in a state of flux, with wide disagreement among honest and
responsible people. The range of opinion among reasonable men runs from deep
religious conviction that any destruction of incipient human life, even to save the
life of the mother, is murder, to the equally fervent belief that the failure to limit
procreation is itself unconscionable and immoral if offspring are destined to be
idiots, or bastards, or undernourished, maleducated rebels against society.“
After discussing the relation between intercourse and procreation, and
the population issue the comment continues:
“To use the criminal law against a substantial body of decent opinion, even if it be
minority opinion, is contrary to our basic traditions. Accordingly, here as
elsewhere, criminal punishment must be reserved for behaviour that falls below
standards generally agreed to by substantially the whole community".32
(1. They show, in a rough manner, existing gaps between law and opinion.
Nothing follows from this in itself unless we subscribe to the view expressed
in the quotation just given. If we do not, we can of course draw precisely the
ppposite policy conclusion: Don’t adjust law to opinion, adjust opinion to
aw.
e. They are one of the very few areas in which we have some consensus
on what the facts are, or were at the time the surveys were taken. This exists
in so few areas surrounding the debate on abortion, that a few relatively hard
data should be welcome.
A. Doctor’s views
1. U.S.A. —Psychoanalyists —— 1959: Anonymous questionnaire to 752
psychoanalyists, members of the American Psycho-analytic Association.
Response rate: 56% (n. 430). “Do you regard the legally restricted
availability of abortion as socially desirable?” ~
202 or nearly 50% “Yes”. Sample has 7% RC5. No further details
available.
Source: Thomas S. Szasz, “The Ethics of Abortion”, Humanist Sept. —
Oct. 1966, pp. 147—48.
Comment: Not sufficient detail available, but in any case neither a
random nor a quota sample, but a self-selected one through response
rate. No importance on its own.
32. A. L. 1. Model Penal Code, par. 207.11, comment 1 at 150—51 (Tent. Draft No.
9 1959) q. by Louis B. Schwartz, “Morals Offences and the Model Penal Code”,
Columbia Law Review, 63 (4), April 1963, pp. 669—86, at p. 685. 
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.2.
New York —0bstetricians and Gynecologists, I965.—-January 1965,
questionnaire survey of 2,285 (all) obstetricians and/or gynecologists in
N.Y. — 62% response rate. 85.3% of respondents — constituting 50.4%
of all obstetricians —— gynecologists in N. Y. state favour liberalization of
abortion law on the lines of A. L. I. model penal code. (Main indications
“a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health. of the mother, or that the child
would’be born with grave physical or mental defect, or the pregnancy
resulted from rape. . .or from incest.”)
. Source: Robert E. Hall, “New York Abortion Law Survey”, American J.
of Obs. and Gyn., 93 (8), December 15, 1965, pp. 1182—83.
Comment: All right, subject to standard limitations of questionnaire
method.
New' York State Hospital Doctors, 1966—Summer 1966 survey by
subcommittee of the N. Y. County Medical Society of all 394 state
hospitals. Response rate: 69% of 274 hospitals. Of these 79 had no
obstetrical service and 35 were Catholic, leaving 160 hospitals as a
basis. Of these 139 had performed therapeutic abortions in the last 5
years. Should therapeutic abortion boards be required and if so by
whom? 44% — yes, by medical profession; 39% — leave to discretion
of hospital; 15% of respondents (21 doctors of whom 14 were
Catholics) — yes, required by law.
Asked their views on existing N.Y. laws: (n — 136 doctors) 75%
liberalize + 9% abolish i.e. 84% feel too restrictive; 9% unchanged, 7%
enforce more rigidly — this means 21 doctors of which 14. were
Catholics.
Source: Robert Hall, “Present Abortion Practices in Hospitals of New
York State”,New York Medicine, 23 (4), March 1967, pp. 124—26.
Comment: 218(2) but distribution of religion should have been given.
One of the very few polls which asks the question about more rigid
enforcement of existing laws which should always be asked.
U.S., Canadian and overseas Psychiatrists, 1965.— December 1965
questionnaire survey of all members of the American Psychiatric
Association: 12,974 abroad with 40.6% (5,289) response, rate; 794
abroad with 33.1% (263) response rate. “Yes” replies only
U.S. A. = U.S.A. C = Canada 0 = all othel
Do you believe a pregnancy should be interrupted . . . .
a'. When the life of the mother is endangered?
U.S. A.: 97.1% C. 94.5% 0: 93.9%
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b. When the physical health of the mother might be impaired?
U. S. A: 86.5% C: 81.2% 0: 74.5%
c. When there is a significant risk that the mental or emotional
health of the mother might be jeopardized?
US. A: 88.8% C: 86.1% 0: 77.6%
d. When there is a significant risk that the child would be born
mentally or physically defective?
U. S. A.: 90.2% C: 78.8% 0: 79.6%
e. When the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest of a girl under
16?
U.S.A.: 91.7% C: 86.7% 0: 78.6%
f. When the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest of a girl over 16?
U.S.A.: 86.3% C: 77.6% 0: 69.4%
g. Whenever the woman requests it?
U. S. A.: 23.5% (many with qualiﬁcations)
C: 14.5% 0: 13.3%
Source: Ralph M. Crowley and Robert W. Laidlaw, “Psychiatric Opinion
regarding Abortion: Preliminary Report of a Survey”, Am. J. of
Psychiatry, 124 (4), October 1967, pp. 145—48.
Comment: Note the U. S. — Canadian differentials on eugenics, rape and
incest. A good survey, subject to limitations of the technique. Overseas
figures inspire less confidence but are “pulled back” by relatively small
gaps between them and U.S. — Canadian pattern. No questions on
socroeconomic reasons.
U. S. and Canadian doctors, 1967, Questionnaire survey, with 7,482 1
replies in Canada — 30.3% of doctors, and 40,089 in U.S. — no '
response rate given.
“Are you in favour of liberalizing the existing laws on therapeutic
abortion?”
All replies: Yes: U.S. 86.9% Canada 84.9%
No: U.S. 13.1% Canada 12.3% 2.7% qualiﬁed
By type of doctor U. S. A. Canada . .
in favour in favour agalnst quallf.
All psychiatrists 94.6%
Non R. C. only 93.3%
Interns 87.8% 9.9% 2.3%
Specialists (obs. gyn.) 83.7% 86.0% . 11.9% 2.1%
GPs 82.3% 82.3% . 14.3% 3.4%
R. C. doctors 49.1%
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The table below gives the speciﬁc conditions and the percentage of
physicians who thought these should be indications for a legal abortion. 2.3%
in U.S. and 6.4% in Canada gave no legal indications when asked about
speciﬁc conditions.
Canada U. S. A.
a. Substantial risk of maternal death 77.7% 76.5%
b. Pregnancy after rape or incest 70.2% 75.1%
c. Direct, positive evidence of 72.1% 71.7%
fetal abnormality
d. Substantial risk to maternal
physical health 68.2% 69.7%
e. Possibility of fetal abnormality 51.3% 62.7%
f. Substantial risk to maternal
mental health r: ' 61.3% 60.6%
g. Substantial risk of 'mat. suicide 59.2% _ 58.6%
h. Substantial risk to mat. emotional
health 39.2% 44.5%
i. Illegitimacy 20.7% 29.1%
j. Socioeconomic reasons 24.5% 26.6%
k. At request of pregnant woman for
any reason , 9.4% 14.3%
Source: Modern Medicine USA 24 April 1967: Modern Medicine of Canada,
May 1967 (comparative tables mine).
Comment: Compare with (4) and again note difference re eugenic
reasons. Presentation of U.S. data not as full as those of Canadian. U. S.
response rate not given but apparently somewhat lower than Canadian
one. Usual qualiﬁcations re self-selected questionnaire method.
6. London Doctors, [964. — 2,237 questionnaires to all London doctors,
Sept-Dec. 1964; 144 returned by G.P.O.; 2,093 received of which just
over 35% or 751 reply.
a. 69.5% approve of ALRA aims; 8% approve with minor reservations;
8% approve some grounds; 10% disapprove; 4% unclear or N. A.
b. “Do you consider that an abortion in hospital conditions in the ﬁrst
12 weeks of pregnancy is a safe operation for a woman in good health?”
Yes — 84% Fairly safe — 5% Yes, in ﬁrst 10 weeks—5% Various
reservations—2% No-4% N. A. and D.KT4.5%
c. “In your experience which causes more psychological trouble (a)
having a hospital abortion (b) having a child against one’s will?”
(a) 10% (b) 57% Doubtful 14% D.K. 11% N.A. 8%
Source: ALRA: “Full Figures of Survey of Doctors”, Jan. 1965, roneod.
cf. Madeleine Simms, “Abortion and Public opinion”, Family Planning
July 1965.
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Comment: Comparison with May 1967 poll (7, below) shows pro-ALRA
Self-selection or suggests this, but less than one mightthink. Treat this
i with some caution. Note that on the comparative and much more
' “social” question hesitation goes up to round 1/3. Note striking
' consensus on safety of abortions, given conditions stated.
7. UK. Doctors, I967. — May 1957, National Opinion Polls survey,
‘ random sample of CPS on their attitude to the medical termination-of ,
Pregnancy Bill: »
Generally satisfactory — ' 59% *
Unsatis. — too restricted — 6% Le. 65%_ for
Unsatis. — should be more restricted 21% liberilization
l Unsatis. — disapprove all grounds 10% ‘
I Undecided - 4% '
Comment. Satisfactory sampling — random survey. Striking in showing
small minority opposed to all change. A chance was missed to correlate
opinion with religion — a great pity. Of Britain’s 22,000 doctors nearly
5,000 are Catholics (Madeleine Simms, letter in Observer 11.6.67) so if
they had been solidly against all grounds the ﬁgure for this would have
been above 10%. Some must have voted for “more restrictions” and
otherwise — but we do not know the distribution.
B. Clergy "X
8. London 1966 — Autumn 1966, ALRA survey by questionnaire, 1,011
Protestant and Catholic clergy in South London and Southern Home
v counties, response rate 46%-(n — 459). ~
.“Has the foetus the same rights as an adult human being from the
moment of fertilization of the ovum?”
Catholics: Yes — 80%
Protestants — nearly all ‘No’
Has same rights:
at birth 31%
' at viability (28 weeks) i 45%
' at quickening
(16 weeks) ' 16%
no data 8%
Methodists, Congregationalists and Quakers most liberal.
b. Should an abortion be legal for (Protestants; Yes)
i. preserving physical health 1 . 84%
ii. preserving mental health . 83%
iii. serious risk of defective child ' ‘ 68%
iv. rape 84%
V. incest .- 76%
vi. if pregnant girl under 16 ‘- 49%
g ' vii. taking social grounds “into account” 57%
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Catholics: 5% for rape —- nothing else '
89% of Protestants thought the existing law was unsatisfactory
Source: ALRA Annual Report, 1966—67 p. 5; ALRA Newsletter, 17.,
Winter 1966, p. 3
Comment The question on the rights of the fetusIS very badly phrased
— “adult” should not have been used. No sample or percentage for
London clergy is given, nor ﬁgures for Sub-samples. Very poor, of
exploratory value only. I
/
9. C. Police 4 1963
I
~
“Only 24 per cent of the policemen who were questioned in|1963 said
they thought abortion should be a criminal offence.”
Source: Ben Whitaker, The Police Penguin ed. London 1964,
p.32 — for sample see p., 21 note 3.
Com’memj: No details of sample, exploratory only.
" D. Catholics — special groups
10. England, 1_967—'Gallup P011, “practising Roman Catholics” 16 and over.
Defined as those who claimed to attend Mass “fairly regularly”. Of
those selfdescribed as R.Cs 71% claimed to go to' Mass at least 2—3
times a month.
Approval of legal abortion ' Approve V Disapprove DK
Where mother’s health is ~ ,
in danger ' 64% 23% 13%
Where a child may be born '
deformed 39% 43% 18%
Where mother wants it 6% . 78% 16%
Source: Sun-Herald 2 April 1967, pp. 45, 93 at p. 45 .
Comment: Not stated whether random or quota sampling but U.K.
Gallup has good reputation. Seems‘all right.
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11. U. S. Catholics — 1967—Louis~Harris poll, random survey, adults only.
“Support the church” on abortion position 58%
“Oppose the church’s stand’f 28%
Not sure . 14%
Would favour abortion for unwed girl who
became pregnant while visiting near an
Army Camp 10%
Favour abortion for rape _ 46%
Favour abortion for mother of young children ‘-
whose life endangered by the pregnancy 58%
and “more than 2/3 of those under 35” ‘
Under 35: Support Church 58% vs. 30% ,
College graduates: Support it 58% to 32%
Source: Newsweek, March 20, 1967, pp. 38-44 at pp. 42—3
Comment: Sample all right, wording of questions not given and details a
little vague, but broadly all right.
12. California Catholics, 1966 — Quota sample, California Poll, adults only.
Given brief (and accurate) description of California law, then asked
whether in favour “of very restricted abortion laws, of liberalizing
abortion laws somewhat [physical or mental health of mother;
deformity of baby] or allowing unrestricted legal abortion?”
Restrict Liberalize - Unrestricted No. 0p.
All 25% 56% 9% 10%
Protestants 24% 58% 9% 9%
Roman Catholics 36% 46% 5% 13%
Comment: All right.
13. Male N. Y. students. — Survey by Fr. Bruce M. Ritter, of all-male
Catholic Manhattan College questionnaire re, 83% return only 26%
“oppose abortion”. _ <
Source: Time 5.5.67 and Sun—Herald 3.3.68
Comment: One college, no further details. Exploratory.
14. U. K. Teenagers, 1968 — “Teenage questionnaire” in London, Catholic
Herald, asked to reply N — 1350
“Do you agree with abortion under any circumstances?”
Yes—40% No—59% DK—‘— 1% ‘
Source: Catholic Weekly 8.2.68
Comment: Of slight exploratory value only
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E. Catholic — National Surveys
15. Germany, 1967 — National survey by Emnid Institute, quota sample.
16.
17.
Approving of legal abortion after rape:
Yes No NA
All 80% 18% 2%
Men 81% 17% , 2%
Women 79% 20% 1%
Protestantchurchgoers 79% 19% 2%
Catholic churchgoers 60% 38% 2%
Source: “Diesseits und Jenseits”, Der Spiegel, 21 (52) 18 December
_1967, pp. 38—58
.U. S. A. — I962—Gallup poll on Finkbine thalidomide case: “Do you
think this woman did the right thing or the wrong thing, in having this
abortion operation”?
All Catholics Protestarz ts
Right thing 52% 33% 56%
Wrong thing 32% 49% 27%
No opinion 16% 18% ' 17%
Source: Sun 25.9.1962
U.S.A. and U. K. 1965—66—Comparison between~ select results of
NORC U.S. survey December 1965 and NOP U.K. survey July 1966.
Abortion should be legal for the following indications: (Yes replies only)
U. S. A U. K.
Health of Mother 71% 85%
Defect in fetus 55% 91%
Rape 56% 82%
‘Women only — compared by religion:
U. S. Prots. U. K. C. of E.
Health 72% 89%
Defect in fetus 55% 94%
Rape 56% 84%
U. S. R.Cs U.K. REL
Health 58% 61%
Defect in fetus 43% 71%
Rape 47% 67%
Source: U. S. A.: Alice S. Rossi, “Public Views on Abortion”, reporting
on and discussing the results of a survey conducted (quota sampling,
adults) by the National Opinion Research Center in December 1965.
Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago, 1966. MS.
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pp.27. Only a severely abridged version of this appeared in print, Alice
S. Rossi, “Abortion Laws and their Victims” Transaction,
.September—October 1966, p 6 (off print; pages unnumbered). For
another version see her chapter “Public Views on Abortion ” in Alan F.
Guttmacher (ed.) The Case for Legalized Abortion Now, Berkeley, 1967,
pp. 26—53.
U.K., National Opinion Polls, “Survey on Abortion” 'July 1966.
Random sample as part of four of their normal surveys, during which all
women interviewed received a questionnaire in a sealed envelope. 3,500
women received these and 2,132 returned them — a response rate of
60.9%.
In spite of the different sample design — the U.K. study refers to
women only — rough comparisons are possible since a March 1965 NOP
study in England, “Abortion Law”, showed that there were no
signiﬁcant differences on the broad issues between men and women.
However, given also different formulation of the questions, the
comparisons must be very rough and should only be used with this
limitation in mind
I have compared the following:
Health: U. S.: “If the woman’s own health is seribusly endangered by the
pregnancy” with U. K.: “If her health would suffer by having a child”.
Eugenic: US. “If there is a strong chance of a'serious defect in the
baby.”
U. K. “If the baby was likely to be born seriously deformed’i Rape:
U. S. “If she became pregnant as a result of rape”. U. K. : “If she has
been raped.”
Clearly, only the ‘rape’ question is strictly equivalent.
U.K. 1965 —- National Opinion Polls, in March 1965, carried out a very
careful and detailed survey, based on a systematic probability sample of
electors, on abortion law. This included 5 questions with 13
subcategories, on what the present law on' abortion was, what it should
be, under what circumstances abortions should be legal, the role of the
woman and the doctor and of panels, and suggested punishments for
doctors acting illegally and for unqualiﬁed abortionists. Replies are
cross-classiﬁed by class, age, knowledge of the law, region, marital status
and religion. Only a few highlights can be given here.
Knowledge of the law—Those who think abortion is now (March 1965)
Always legal 1%
Legal in some cases 49.3%
Always illegal 42.1%
DK_ ‘ 7.6%
Catholics tended to believe slightly more frequently-about a 5%
difference .— than C. of E. that‘abortion was always illegal.
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This poll is one of the few which asked about getting “tougher” i.e. it
asked whether abortion should be legal in all cases, some cases, or illegal
in all cases. However 24.1% thought it should‘be illegal in all cases, but
if this is crossclassified with knowledge of the law it is clear that the
answer was usually merely an endorsement of an imagined status quo:
6.1% of those who knew the law (legal in some cases) wanted all
abortions made illegal vs. 41.6% of those who did not know it.
Indications: 12 questions as to possible indications for legal abortions
were asked from all but those who thought all abortions should be legal
. (6.4%) or illegal (24.1%). “Yes” i.e. “should be permitted” percentages
only are given here.
All C. of E. RC.
Physical health 63.9% 68% 48%
Mental health 62.8% 67% 46%
Deformed child 51.8% 58% 33%
Large family so that another
child “would cause ﬁnancial
hardship and worry” 30.0% 35% 16%.
Illegitimate child~ 9.9% 11% 7%
Unmarried woman
under 16 22.7% 25% ' 14%
Rape 55.1% 59% 37%
Incest 49.0% 53% 29%
Moral beliefs and legal punishment—This NOP poll, which is
methodologically by luck, exceptionally good is the only one I have
seen which throws light on what people think should happen to doctors
and others who break abortion laws.
It shows beyond reasonable doubt that a clear majority want a doctor
who performs abortions on demand punished, though even here only
9.6% wanted to give him a prison sentence. But a huge majority wanted
no punishment for a doctor who carried out illegal abortions he thought
morally justified. This was endorsed by all classes, regions, religions, and
all types of marital status. 63% of Catholics wanted no punishment for
such a doctor. (Of course the ﬁgures exclude those who think abortions
should always be legal (6.4%) or always illegal (24.1%) and only refer to
those (66.1%) who thought they should be legal in some cases). Again a
huge majority of nearly 79% wanted to send an unqualiﬁed abortionist
to prison.
All except those who thought abortion should always be legal or
illegal were asked:
“In the following cases, which of these should happen to a person who
performs abortionsvwhich are illegal under the present law.
a. A doctor who carries out abortionsfor any woman who asks him.
b. A doctor who only carries out abortions which he thinks are
morally justified. . .
c. An unqualiﬁed abortionist who carries out abortions for any
woman who asks.
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Case (a) Doctor — on demand
I All C. ofE. R.C.
A prisén sentence 9.6% 10 15
Forbidden to continue as a .
practising doctor 33.5 33 36
Heavy ﬁne —£stg 500 ~
or more 29.4 29 - 22
Smaller ﬁne — less than ’
£500 14.9 . 16 14
No punishment 9.2 8 11
DK 3.3 3 ' 3
Case (b) DoctOr — moral self-justiﬁcation
‘ Prison 0.9% 1 3
Sordid practising 3.7 4 4
Heavy fine 6.4 6 10
Smaller fine 14.8 15 17
No punishment 70.1 ‘ 70 63
DK 4.1 4 4
Case (c) Unqualiﬁed — on demand
Prison 78.8% 78 81
Heavy ﬁne 13.2 14 10
Smaller ﬁne 3.6 3 4
No punishment 1.1 1 1
DK 3.3 ' 3 4
UK. — 1966 — National Opinion Polls, July 1966, random sample and
then questionnaire to women only in sealed envelope — 60.9% response
rate.
“Do you think it should be made easier to obtain a legal abortion?”
All C. ofE. RC.
Yes 75% 77 57
No 20 18 ‘ 37
DK 4 4 5
NA 2 2 1
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Indications for legal abortions:
All C. of E. RC.
Health 85% 89 61
Deformity 91 94 71
Rape 82 84 67
Incest 65 68 51
Under 16 so 51 43
“Her living
conditions made it
undesirable to have
a child” 36 37 30
Respondents were also given an open-ended choice i.e. to write in any
other reasons. 86% had no other reasons. 2%: parents of low mentality;
3% parents have their planned number of children and cannot cope with
more; 6% if pregnancy “unwanted for any reason whatsoever”; 1%
financial position made it undesirable; 3% heredity disease, VD, family
history of mental deficiency.
These can be roughly recombined as —
a. Elective or nearly so — 10%
b. Eugenic — 5%
There was a question “Do you think the pregnant woman alone should
be able to decide whether or not she has an abortion” for which the
“Yes” replies roughly are the same as legal socio-economic indications.
(30% vs. 36%) 69% thought she should be able to decide this by herself,
there being no signiﬁcant difference by religion.
Asked to write in “Who else should be consulted?” 48% were not able
to name anyone. Of those who did name someone: 37% her doctor;
36% her doctor and another doctor; 20% a special abortion committee;
only 13% “Husband, father of the child”; 2% parents, family, close
relations; 1% Psychiatrist.
No significant difference by religion.
This question is ambiguously phrased — “able to decide” and “consult”
are open to a number of interpretations. When asked: “Should the
father of the child have the right to prevent a woman having an
abortion?” the father’s role came out more strongly, but still only as a
minority view.
All C. of E. RC.
Yes 31% 32 41
No 56 56 45
DK 9 9 - 10
NA 4 3 5
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Abortion Experience — The survey shows that, with a sealed
questionnaire, women will reply to questions on whether they have had
abortions.
The results, summarized, were: 1946—65: average of 40,000 abortions
p.a. of which 31,000 illegal. (Current guesses were between 10 —
100,000). In these 20 years 600,000 women had had abortions, of
which 125,000 had had more than one. In addition there were 85,000
attempted abortions p.a.. .
How performed (illegal ones): Almost 60% self-induced; 21% performed
by someone who was not a doctor, and 23% performed by a doctor
illegally.
rOn whom performed: 65% on married women, 28% on single, 56% on
women aged 20—30. 58% had children at the time, 45% have had
children since.
Cost: The great majority of illegal abortions cost very little — 50% cost
less than istg. 1 and 30% between £1 — 50.
Working class women were more likely to have had an abortion than
. middle class ones; Roman Catholic women were no less likely to have
had an abortion than women of other religious convictions.
Comment: In my view the subsamples, e.g. by class or religion, are too
small to permit statistically signiﬁcant conclusions. There are figures on
Catholics and abortions for e.g. Chile, France, and Italy but all these
refer to guesses about illegal abortions and do not permit comparisons
between or within religions. It would, however, be fair to say that some
countries which have predominantly Roman Catholic populations also
have high abortion rates, especially in Latin America. We just do not
know whether in such countries being a Catholic does or does not make
a difference, if we hold all other factors constant. Any “facts” on this
point should be looked at most carefully for their alleged empirical
status.
Note that most people in England, while favouring easier abortion laws
in 1965—66 also thought that it was a Christian country. Asked, in mid
1965 by a NOP poll: “By and large, do you think of Britain as a
Christian country or not?” 79.7%. replied “Christian” (C. of E. 85%,
RCs 78%), 19% “not Christian” (C. of E. 15%. RC5 21%) and 1.3% were
DK/NA. ‘
Ronald Goldman, “Do we want our children taught about God?”, New
Society, 139,27 May 1965, pp. 8—10, at p.9.
While the “Yes” replies increased with age, even in'the 21—24 year old
group 72% thought that Britain was by and large a Christian country.
USA — 1965 — The late 1965 NORC poll analysed by Dr Rossi (see 17)
is one of the most careful. Her major relevant ﬁnding as to the
percentage approving legal abortion under specified conditions was:
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Men Women
Prot. RC Prat. RC.
Maternal health 73 64 72 58
Rape 57 47 56 47
Defect in fetus 57 48 55 43
Family poor can’t afford
more children 22 21 18 12
Unmarried and does not want ‘ ’ "““~
to marry the man 19 18 12 9\
Married, wants no more .
children 17 19 1 l 8
Dr Rossi is able to show that the slight differences mask an important
differential effect of education ~ which has a liberalizing effect on
protestants but none on Catholics. So there are large religious
differences among the better educated, low ones among those low in
educational attainment. The reason, she suggests, is the effect of
parochial schools on Catholics, the longer they stay in them the more
likely, in this ﬁeld, are they to accept the Church’s views. (cf. the work
of Dr Hans MOI of the A. N. U.)
But both educational attainment and religious afﬁliation, are, in the US,
related to Church attendance, better educated people are, more likely to
go to church, and Catholics at every educational level are.m0re likely to
do so. Church attendance and educational attainment contribute about
equally‘ to views on abortion.
So: the least liberal views are held by high church-attending and
low-educated; the most liberal views by low church attenders who are
highly educated. However, even the least permissive group of high
church attenders who have low education approves (with 59%) of
abortion for reasons of maternal health. The most permissive group —
high education, low church attendance — has the biggest minority (36%)
favouring abortion as a method of birth control for the married.
Moreover, the differences which appear in the extract reproduced here
as between men and women are insigniﬁcant once church attendance
(much more frequent with women) is taken into account.
Australia 1967 — Here there are only two surveys. Dr D. Chappell and
Mr P. R. Wilson conducted one through Roy Morgan’s interviewers in
November 1967 and I am most obliged to Dr Chappell for making the
results — embodied in'a paper to appear in the Australian Law Journal
— available to me.
64% disagree with the view that “Abortions should not be legal or
allowed under any circumstances” with 27% agreeing, 7% unsure and 2%
not answering. 0f the 64% who do not object to all abortion 92%
would allow it for danger to the mother’s life, 85% for rape, 75% for
danger of mental or physical deformity for the child, and only 27%
where for economic reasons the mother would be unable to support the
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child. 40% of Roman Catholics vs. 69% of Anglicans favour abortion in
certain circumstances. Amongst Catholics opposition to all legal abortion
correlates with churchgoing — from a third of strong Catholic
churchgoers willing to have some legal abortions to 50% of those who
are moderate churchgoers and 79% of those who do not go at all. I do
not know the relationship between this and educational background.
Sex differentials are given — among the.younger the women are more
permissive than the men, among the older vice versa — but this may be
a disguised effect of frequency of church-attendance. (cf. Rossi)
Dr. Chappell infers that a limited amount of reform is politically
possible — he clearly believes it to be desirable. For him the key fact is
the 64% who are ‘not opposed to all reform, plus, presumably the fact
that he can now point to those 49% of Catholics who do not 'oppose all
reform. The D. L.P. sees it differently. In an article on “The Political
Significance of Abortion”, in its Victorian monthly ( The Democrat
7(2), June 1968, p. 7) it has this sub-heading:
”73% against it
Gallup polls show that the majority of Australians perceive and reject
the evil of abortion for economic reasons (73 per cent, Herald, March 5,
1968). To have it accepted, the malicious intent of abortion must be
disguised by spurious claims of care for the mother’s physical and
mental health”.
Sydney— Melbourne, 1968 — In early 1968, a Sydney Marketing
Research ﬁrm, M. F.I. Surveys, appended a question on abortion law
reform to one of its regular surveys. A representative sample of homes
in two capital cities was used, and the respondents are married women
only. I am indebted to the Managing Director of MRI. Surveys, Mr
Ronald Vickers, for making detailed results available to me. If it were
possible to extract data from the Chappell—Wilson survey for married
women only, the two- surveys might be compared. The main point is
that M. F. I. used a rough intensity of attitude measure.
“Should abortion be made legal if carried out by a properly qualiﬁed
medical practitioner?”
Sydney Melbourne
Yes, definitely 44% 36
Yes, most probably 20 26
64% 62%
Undecided 10 13
Probably not 5 4
Definitely not 21 21
26%
 
 
  
Social Attitudes to and Moral Implications of Abortion 69
 
The werding of the questions and the sampling base of the two surveys
differ — all the same one may point to an emerging picture:
Antis: These are made up of a hard core of 21% plus a slightly softer
cortex of round 4 — 6%
Pros: Here once more the two surveys agree broadly — this group is
round 62-66% with 64% as the national average — but the MRI.
research means that a much higher proportion of the “pros” are “soft”
pros than is the case for the “soft” antis.
One can then speculate — and this comes out in the Chappell—Wilson
survey when it gets down to particular indicators for legal abortion —
that a lot will depend on how the legislation is framed when it comes.
But I stress again that the soft cortex of the “pros” is of considerable ‘
importance.
Now that the Victorian Liberal State Executive has endorsed a policy of
reform which would codify practices which existed till recently amongst
reputable doctors in Melbourne, the ALP has followed with a much
bolder policy. On the recommendation of its Executive its Victorian
State conference endorsed a policy which would make it lawful for a
registered medical practitioner to terminate a pregnancy.
1. “To save the mother’s life
2. To avoid injury to her physical or mental health taking account of
her “actual or foreseeable” environment.
3. If there is a risk of the child being born with physical or mental
abnormality.
4. If the mother is a victim of rape or is of unsound mind.”
(For full text of Conference decisions, see FACT, February, 13, 1970,
p. 6.)
CONCLUSION.
For good or for evil, the‘long silence on abortion in Australia has at last
been broken. The first pro-reform propaganda pamphlet, by Mr John Bennett
has just appeared in Melbourne under the title Abortion Law Reform? Not
surprisingly, he used the Chappell—Wilson as well as the M.F.I. survey to
back up his case.
The overseas surveys, in their general impact, are clear enough: there is
a clear and substantial majority for “moderate” reform. Catholics are deeply
divided, with nowhere any indication that a majority of them support‘the
position of their Church to the full. (Gallup Polls have just started in Ireland
—— will they take a survey?) Doctors overseas are much more inclined to be
permissive than one generally assumes Australian doctors to be. Even though
we have only two exploratory small studies, it seems that there might be a
sizable proportion of people who believe that human life starts only at birth.
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But, at the same time, there is not yet much support for, the position of
the American Civil Liberties Union i.e. that of elective abortion. Event amongst
nonchurch-going highly educated people only a minority favours it. Perhaps
this can be explained in terms of punitive attitudes towards “free sex” and
fear what a further decline in sanctions might not do. By and large, it is not
apparently the case that women as a group differ much from men in attitudes
once we take into account church-going and education. Thus there may not
be very much to the standard feminist point that it should all be left to the
women — that a discussion of abortion by men is like one by dogs about cats.
Reform will come in a manner and style which characterizes most of the
debate: it will be dishonest, the arguments for and against it will avoid the
key issue of elective abortion, it will be furtive, it will be emotional.
It will also to a considerable extent be irrelevant to what women do and
how many abortions they get — but not to the conditions under which they
get them.
Personally, if I held the standard “pro-reform” position — which I do
not — I would put all my money on that famous “abortion pill” which could
be taken regularly so that no women need know whether in fact she was or
was not ever pregnant.
If I held that standard “anti-reform” position _—- which I do not — I
would put all my money on encouraging research which would make the
woman’s body translucent and the fetus visible.
As it is, I don’t put my money on anyone or anything and must leave
you where I am: in doubt.
POSTSCRIPT
To list, let alone analyse, the ﬂood of material on abortion since 1968
would require a new and long paper.
I will offer brief comments on some important new trends.
Changing focus of debate
The key issues in the abortion discussion are shifting — first, there is
much more concentration now on elective abortion, second, there is an
increasingly close link with ecology.
While there are still many papers written in terms of some kind of cost/
benefit approach, the abstract question of the right of the state to enforce
“compulsory pregnancy” is now to the fore. Increasingly, the whole burden of
the debate is shifting from a concentration on what might justify a demand
for abortion to what might justify the government in putting any legal
obstacles in the way of such a demand.
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The cry for the abolition of all anti-abortion laws was considered
“extreme” only a few years ago, by now an increasing number of respectable
organizations have embraced it. Partial reforms, such as the A. L. 1. code, seem
increasingly less attractive. The demand for elective abortion is coming to a
head in the United States, where challenges to the constitutionality of
abortion laws are .on the increase. A number of lower courts have already
considered the issue, and it seems that the Supreme Court will have a case
before it before long. One cannot guess whether it will decide on the issue of
principle or try and postpone such a decision by conﬁning itself to more
technical matters.
However, on the whole the trends have been going strongly in support
of much more permissive legislation, and indeed in the direction of elective
abortion. By now fourteen States have relatively liberal abortion laws.
Significantly, some of them, even after a very short experience, are
considering further liberalization. Hawaii and New York now have elective
abortion, and this is bound to have its impact on other states. Lower court
decisions, so far, have gladdened the hearts of the reformers. All recent
opinion surveys show a rapidly increasing support for abortion on
socioeconomic grounds or simply on demand. How much difference, in
practice, there is between these two positions depends only in small part on
the law: once socio-economic reasons are introduced openly, by their very
nature they are bound to be even vaguer than medical, psychiatric or eugenic
reasons. Their interpretation must, in practice, lie in the hands of doctors. If
we assume that doctors have shifted towards a more permissive attitude and
will continue to do so, which seems a realistic assumption, the gap between
the consequences of legalizing socio-economic reasons for abortion and
abortion on demand will continue to decrease.
Given the recent trends in Western societies towards “dc-authorization”
it seems reasonable to predict that even if particular legal decisions for a time
should attempt to stem the tide, the right of the state to make any laws in
this field will come under increasing challenge.
The rise of the Woman’s Liberation Movement will further strengthen
this tendency. One of the most fascinating — the fascinating may be that of
horror or of admiration or a mixture of both — social processes of the last
few years has been the very rapid adaption by the “establishment” of
positions held, shortly before, by “extremists” and “outsiders”. Adaption
seems the right word — it is a separate question how far these positions are
then watered down. [S such a policy to be seen as a victory for the rebels and
for counter-culture or rather to be taken as a sign of the tremendous strength
of the status quo?
However that may be, the key point made by the Woman’s Liberation
Movement — that women’s roles are not directly and functionally derived
from permanent biological imperatives, that anatomy is not destiny, but rather
can be explained as based on sociological factors which are subject to change
— will, even though with some watering down, become very widespread in the
near future.
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This, in turn, will lead to a much more questioning attitude to the
whole concept of motherhood. Together with the increasing separation of sex
and reproduction it is bound to lead to an ever stronger demand for elective
abortion. Thus the process of rationalization, which is sketched in my paper,
will continue.
It is highly significant that those who wish to oppose, or at least slow
down, abortion on demand have to give ground year by year, at least in
industrialized societies. In order to ﬁght the more extreme position they have
had to say less and less about their basic opposition to all-direct abortion, let
alone about “the evils” of contraception.
The link between the abortion issue and population policy is, by 1970,
much more complex than it seemed only two years ago.
For most non-experts, the population problem was mainly
conceptualized in terms of acrude image of pressure of numbers on food
resources. Ecology is a fad at the moment, and like other fads may end in
general boredom. But the endless books and newspaper articles will at least
leave behind them some general notion that the life-carrying capacity of this
globe is threatened not only by the burgeoning of population, but also by the
cumulative effect of existing technology and the special
environment-destroying potential of newly developed technology. It seems
rather likely that, however, the matter is put, some kind of “people =
pollution” equation will become increasingly popular and politically relevant.
It may start, as it has in Australia, by. a questioning of immigration
policy, and especially on its impact on urban resources and the urban
environment. But however it starts, it is unlikely that it will be able to avoid
the issue of cutting-down numbers. Elective abortion is a very crude, but
possibly in some cultures very rapid, way of doing this. If (see below)
abortion can be rationalized further so that the operation requires fewer
resource-inputs, it seems likely that it may, increasingly, become part and
parcel of a deliberate population policy — as it has in Japan.
It will be hard to work out distinctions between abortion policies
motivated by some conception of fetal or mother’s rights and those which are
in fact population control measures. I for one would expect that in many
countries the latter might be rationalized in terms of the former — with the
supreme irony if we should get compulsory abortions (for
population-ecological reasons) imposed in the name of women’rights.
Changing techniques
Since we now have elective abortion in New York and Hawaii, there
will be much greater pressure than before for research on more rapid and
less time — and resource-consuming methods of performing the operation. In
the paper, I mention the implications of some kind of post-coital “pill”.
More immediately there might be increased use of the suction method and
pressure for performing the operation on an outpatient basis.
it is not necessary to guess details — the main point is clear enough:
given the British and more recent United States laws and, to a lesser extent,
our own in South Australia, research on further rationalizing abortion
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methods is bound to increase. After all, one of the main reasons why there
was relatively little of it was that abortion was illegal, considered immoral, or
both. As these considerations weaken, so research will become an increasingly
“normal” thing. Moreover, as the paper makes clear, few doctors like doing
abortions, hence now that more and more are under pressure to perform legal
ones one may assume that research designed to minimize the number of actual
operations will also increase.
Catholic reactions
Catholics protest that the opposition to abortion law reform is not
purely “Catholic”. This, of course, is true — but it is also true that Catholics
are bound to provide the main force for organized opposition. Their presen
t
tactics are, increasingly, to call for more factual studies and Commissions — a
highly intelligent tactic, since “the facts” are very hard to get, but essentially
one which can only be a delaying move.
It is likely that Catholic theologians will in the near future have to find
ways by which to save face, for the trends (if my analysis is even roughly
right) are heavily against them. They may do this by new stress on the
distinction between morality and law or by partial absorption, under a
different name, of “situation ethics”, or by following Joseph Donceel on th
e
animation—hominization distinction, or by a combination of such moves. It is
hard to see a long continuing battle here, for the Catholic Church has no
longer the power to enforce its moral standards, and the whole birth
control —— abortion issue is becoming increasingly dangerous for it in regions
such as Latin America.
Australia
On the surface there have been some “dramatic” developments since
1968. Dr Bertram Wainer brought the whole issue to the surface, even
forming a party around it, and his allegations against Melbourne police led
to an extensive official enquiry. That some police are involved with some
abortionists can only have been news to the innocent. So far Wainer’s
efforts have simply led to police raids in Melbourne and Sydney and a
break-down in tacit understandings between some police and some doctors.
South Australia has legalized abortion, following the British Act fairly
closely. The Act came into force on January 8, 1970, and it is much to early
to judge its results. In a 1969 Victorian case R. v. Davidson Menhennitt J.
directed the jury that for a therapeutic abortion to be lawful the accused
must have honestly believed on reasonable grounds that the act was necessary
to preserve the woman from some serious danger, including danger to physical
or mental health, and that the measures taken to procure the abortion were
not out of proportion to the danger to be averted. Again, just what difference
this will make to the practice of doctors in Melbourne is not known.
In late July 1970 Dr A. 1. Adams and Mr W. Sussman published the ﬁrst
decent survey of the attitudes of G.Ps in New South Wales. 76% favoured the
reform of abortion laws in New South Wales and 28% favoured elective
abortion. The survey was based on a random sample of 92 Sydney G. Ps.
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Abortion law reform — roughly on the lines of the South Australian Act
—. is now ofﬁcial policy of the Labour opposition in Western Australia and
Victoria. ' '
In general, while there are now a number of Abortion Law Reform
Associations in most States, and while, more recently, there have been some
minor demonstrations in favour of repeal of all laws, the position in Australia
has not changed as much as it has in U. S. A. Both sides have of course cited
those aspects of the British experience which suited them, and, no doubt, will
do the same with rival interpretations of the South Australian Act.
Opinion is changing fairly slowly here, though the different wording of
various polls makes comparison over time very difﬁcult. A clearmajority are
still against abortion on socio-economic grounds and against abortion on
demand. But the long range forces give little comfort to those who oppose
. reform.
The general level of debate has not, in Australia, improved a great deal
since 1968. The original roneoed version of this paper was quoted in a
distorted and selective way by both sides during the agitation in South
Australia, It is pretty likely that a similar fate will overtake this version.
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Appendix A_
The following article, “Protecting Civil Liberties: The Right to
Have an Abortion” is reprinted from CURRENT May 1968, pp.
26—28. The article, as excerpted by CURRENT, is published by
permission of the New York Civil Liberties Union. This extract
illustrates, in non-technical language, some of the major arguments
which have since then been put, in legal language, before the US.
courts. -
PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES
THE RIGHT TO HAVE AN ABORTION
Excerpts from a recent policy statement by the American Civil Liberties
Union calling for the abolition of all laws prohibiting abortion:
“In the last few years legislatures all over the country have taken note of one
of the most persistent but emotionally charged issues of our time, that of the
reform of laws forbidding abortion . . .. The American Civil Liberties Union has
watched these developments with keen interest. We have studied and debated the
issue intensively for more than a year. Our discussion has touched on all aspects-of
the subject, including the various social, medical, moral and theological approaches,
but our final conclusions rest solely on our desire to protect and advance civil
liberties — in particular, the rights of privacy and equality and the freedom of each
individual [woman] to decide for what purposes her body should be used . . .
“The American Civil Liberties Union asserts that a woman has a right to have
an abortion — that is, a termination of pregnancy prior to theviability of the fetus
- and that a licensed physician has a right toperform an abortion, without the
threat of criminal sanctions. In pursuit of this right .the Union asks that state
legislatures abolish all laws imposing criminal penalties for abortions performed, for
whatever reason, by a licensed physician. The effect of this step would be that any
woman could ask a doctor to terminate a pregnancy up to the time that the fetus
becomes viable. (The exact moment at which this happens is not known, but the
medical profession does agree that a fetus could not possibly live apart from the
mother until sometime after the 20th week, and‘ as a practical matter, even with
the best medical care now available, not until several weeks later.) In this term, a
doctor could accede to the woman’s request in accordance with his professional
judgment without fear of criminal prosecution. Thus, the decision whether or not
to continue a pregnancy would become one of the woman’s personal discretion and
the doctor’s medical opinion. Both would be free to follow their private
consciences in determining whether their religious or moral standards Were being
violated. No fear of criminal punishment would enter into the decision.
“The A.C.L.U. holds that every woman, as a matter of her right to the
enjoyment of life, liberty and privacy, should be free to determine whether and
when to bear children. It is not a matter for the state to control. As long as
criminal sanctions are attached to the performance of abortions, however, this
freedom will not be' realized. Even the recognition of special ‘hardship cases’ —
danger to the life and mental or physical health of the mother, probable fetal
deformity, pregnancy resulting from rape or incest — falls short of satisfying the
rights of life, liberty and privacy. Although it is true that a number of
well-established religious and moral doctrines forbid abortion, we do not believe
that the state has the power to force these particular religious and mOral standards
upon the entire community. The Union itself offers no comment of the wisdom or
the moral implications of abortion, believing that such judgments belong solely in
the province of individual conscience and religion. We maintain that the penal
sanctions of the state have no proper application to such matters.
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UNEQUAL SANCTIONS FOR RICH AND 'POOR
“The discriminatory effect of the prohibition of abortion involves another
area of civil liberties interest, that of equality. At a time when our nation is even
more deeply intent upon narrowing the gap between rich and poor and removing
the obstacles which prevent the poor from exercising their fundamental rights as
citizens, we should not perpetuate the kind of inequality that the abortion laws
have produced. The rich can violate the law with impunity, but the poor are at the
law’s mercy. Any sanction which operates in this manner is not acceptable under
civil liberties standards of equal protection of the laws. Moreover, the very fact that
the law is so arbitrarily applied and enforced and so universally ignored itself
weakens the principle of the rule of law which is the backbone of civil liberties.
“The violations of civil liberties inherent in the present abortion laws are
sharply accentuated by the immense medical and social problems to which these
laws have given rise. It is no secret that irnmunerable women secure abortions every
year despite the prohibitions of the law. These women must either ﬁnd doctors
who are willing to stretch the technicalities of the law, or resort to frankly criminal
abortions, most often at the hands of untrained incompetents. The physical,
psychological and social costs of backstreet abortions are too well known to require
enumeration. No less tragic are the consequences to the woman who does not have
the price of a quasi-legal or illegal abortion, to the unwanted child she later brings
into the world, and to the rest of her family.
“The current debate over abortion law reform has revived the oft-heard
contention that removal .of criminal sanctions on abortion will undermine the
morality of our youth and open the door to promiscuity. This is an understandable
concern, but the experience of several European countries which have freely
available or easily available abortion has not borne out this fear. Moreovertthe
statistics of abortion now performed show that the great majority of both legal and
illegal abortions in this country are now sought by and performed upon married
women who already have several children and are pregnant by their own husbands.
The primary impact of the laws would seem to fall not on the unmarried and
potentially promiscuous teenager but on the married woman with an established
family.
“Although the social and medical problems created by prohibition of abortion
are without doubt extremely serious, in pressing for legislative abolition of the
abortion laws the Union bases its arguments solely on its‘ desire to protect and
promote the civil liberties of all citizens. We believe that the abortion laws violate
civil liberties in the following speciﬁc ways: (1) They deprive women of the liberty
to decide whether and when their bodies are to be used for procreation, without
due process of law. (2) They are unconstitutionally vague. (3) They deny to women
in the lower economic groups the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
14th Amendment, since abortions are now freely available to the rich but
unobtainable by the poor. (4) They infringe upon the right to decide whether and
when to have a child, as well as the martial right of privacy. (5) They impair the
right of physicians to practice in accordance with their professional obligations in
that they require doctors not to perform a necessary medical procedure. In many
cases their failure to perform this medical procedure because of the statutory
prohibitions on abortion, would amount to malpractice.”
(Policy Statement on State Laws Prohibiting Abortion, American Civil Liberties
Union, New York, N.Y., Mar. 25, 1968.)
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Appendix B
Reprinted from ATLAS Magazine, August 1966. Translated from
NEPSZABADSAG, Budapest. This extract shows some of the uneasiness now
existing in some countires with practically elective abortion. It illustrates the
interplay of factors relating to “rights” and those relating to “population
policy”.
More Babies Wanted
Translated from NEPSZABADSA G, Budapest
Since 1956, Hungary—following the Russian pattern —has permitted abortions in
state clinics for women who could give sufﬁcient reason, which in practice
meant any woman who wanted one badly enough. Since then the birth rate
has dropped sharply. As a result, Hungary is one country that is not
concerned with the population explosion but is very much concerned with its
depletion. The following partial transcript of a panel discussion of the
problem is reprinted from Budapest’s Nepszabadsag (“People ’s Freedom”), the
country’s leading newspaper and the organ of the Communist Party.
With regard to the birth rate, Hungary takes last place in world statistics:
since 1963 the number of births has dropped to an annual 130,000 (thirteen
per thousand) and the number of induced abortions has soared to an annual
180,000 (eighteen per thousand). The statistical data give food for thought. It
was because of this that our editorial board organized a round-table
conference on the problems of family planning and birth control. The
participants were Zsuzsa Ortutay, secretary of the National Council of
Hungarian Women; gynecologist Dr Zoltan Vadas, department chief in the
Ministry of Health; head physician Dr Gabor Doros; pediatrician Dr Laszlo
Fulop, head of the abortion committee of District 11; writer Gyula Fekete and
Laszlo Szabo, staff member of our editorial board.
Laszlo Szabo: There are people who do not see any danger in our statistical
data because they consider the present situation transitory. They believe that
as the standard of living improves, the matter will solve itself.
Other people fear the extinction of the nation, and maintain that the decree
passed in the Fifties banning induced abortion should be unequivocally
revalidatcd. Dr GABOR DOROS: l side with those who see serious danger in the
present situation. The size of the young age groups is rapidly decreasing, and
the number of elderly people who have to be supported has grown
considerably. This may have a catastrophic effect within a few decades. 1 see
the essence of the matter in an egocentric way of thinking. The reason for the
great number of abortions is that many people just do not want children. 1
think there are some cases when the committees should not grant abortions.
Hearing this, the women, the prospective mothers, would immediately
think that their right to decide whether they want a child—granted by the
law, and inherent in our society—is impaired.
DOROS: This can be accepted under circumstances while in others it cannot.
As far as I know, there are an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 young women
who, though they do not have one single child, decide to have an abortion. In
my opinion, to give birth to a child and to bring it up is as much the duty of
a citizen as—let us say—the defense of the country.
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GYULA FEKETE: I approach the problem from another angle. Unless there is
some change, the ratio of old people to young will continue to widen in the
course of the next few decades. For years, we have only increased our
population by the number of people over sixty. The zero-to-six-year-old group
faces the prospect of supporting the largest number of old people in the
whole world. Have childless parents pondered over this trend and the fact that
they will be supported in their pensioned years by the future generation?
There are other ways one can pay one’s debt to society. But the most
natural way is to have children, and conditions have to be established under
which this is encouraged. This means the so-called “dissuading” factors have
to be eliminated. Poorly planned housing and distribution of apartments are
two such factors. Or the misconception that it is inglorious to be a mother.
Should we interpret your words to mean that a mother must stay at
home, and that her only task is to have and raise children? FEKETE: I did
not mean-that. Women no longer want to be confined within the four walls of
their kitchens." They may choose a profession in economic, social or political
life. This is one of the greatest achievements of our regime. Iknow that, in the
present times, it would be unrealistic to ask people to have four or five
children. But two or three? And anyway: society has the right to count on
motherhood . . . On the other hand, this has to be coordinated with the fact
that the majority of women work and wish to work.
ZSUZSA ORTUTAY: It is an intricate and complex problem. Economic and
social changes—industrialization, urbanization, the increase of economic and
cultural demands, the restratiﬁcation of society—were all factors which had a
share in the fact that a great number of young couples no longer want a child.
Naturally, these young couples fear that, with the birth of a child, their way
of life will change. This is true. On the other hand, only parents know that
the joy given by a child cannot be replaced by any comfort. I think it by no
means desirable to deny the right of a mother to decide when and how many
children she wishes to have. On the other hand, when this law was enforced,
we neglected something: it should have been coupled with preliminary
education and with the guarantee of available preventive methods. For
example, we failed to propagate the use of modern contraceptives. They are
not sold in our drugstores. Thus, only abortion remains, which is used by
many women, not as a free possibility, but with a libertinism which they
abuse. It is not only a matter concerning women, though the right of decision
rests with them, for ultimately the family has to decide. Frequently it
happens that a husband, who loves his comfort, persuades his wife to
interrupt her pregnancy. I think that one of the most important tasks of the
I council is to reinstate in our society the respect due to motherhood.
Let us hear what the physician has to say who has met many thousands
! of women while serving on the abortion committee.
DR LASZLO FULOP: The abortion committee has no right, no opportunity
to force a woman into continuing her pregnancy. There is a so-called
persuasion process, but I cannot cite any example where this was at all
successful. Only a few minutes can be devoted to any patient, and we do not
have a chance to get acquainted with the circumstances of the applicant. For
the time being, the committee is a participant in a superﬂuous administrative
process, and from the point of view of restricting abortion, its work is nil. We
also have our “regular customers”—and their number is large—who come to
report several times a year. Although we stress the dangers involved and the
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tragic conditions they might expect: that they will probably never be able to
have children again, they never listen to us. I think that either this system of
committees should be ended or it should undergo a basic change. '
Is there a connection between sterility and induced abortions?
DR ZOLTAN VADAS: It is difﬁcult to answer this question. One abortion
might. cause sterility, or produce premature birth at a later date. It also might
cause a series of complications, or simply not produce any harmful effects at
all. I met a woman who has had twenty induced abortions since she was
nineteen. She wanted to have a child when she was thirty-one, after her
twentieth operation, but by that time, she was already sterile. It is an
unquestionable fact that the abortions are very harmful to the health.
FEKETE: We talk about the equal rights of women, the splendor of
motherhood, and yet, in twenty years, we have not managed to achieve a
state where family allowances are given to the mother instead of to the
husband, who may give it to his wife or not .. . I wish to add something to
Comrade Vadas’ point, and that is that in my opinion around one third of the
workers are deeply offended, nervous and angry whenever the problems of the
birth rate, family planning and induced abortion are mentioned. The question,
however, is one of national interest.
DOROS: I think that it is in the interest of society and even a duty to the
country to raise a family. For the time being, it is considered “chic” not to
have children, to live childless. The “chic” attitude could be inﬂuenced by an
. adequate taxation of childless parents. Naturally, the money collected in this
i way should be used exclusively for family welfare. I also think that the
maternity leave should be extended, perhaps for one year, and that the
working mother should be paid an allowance from this fund until her child is
three years old. I would suggest the setting up of a national council for family
welfare whose task Would be provide modern information and attempt to
encourage the raising of families.
 
What are the ideas of the women’s council?
ORTUTAY: We, too, think that the solution to the whole complex of
problems should be handed over to some central institution or organization.
This institution should do research on the birth rate and families, and at the
same time perform extensive enlightening work. An education for family life
is a very important task. Doctors, teachers and parents have an important
duty to share. They must, however, receive help, for these are matters about
which very little is mentioned. The still existing prissiness hinders the
acceptance of this topic as natural and mentionable. At present, articles
dealing with this subject, vitally important for our society, still arouse a wave
of shocked opinions. ‘
FEKETE: May I contribute to the debate. I would make it possible for
mothers of small babies to stay at home with an allowance until the child is
three years old. I see this sum being covered by the previously mentioned
taxation of childless families. For motherhood has not only biological, but
also social aspects. Mother love is one of the cornerstones of family life.
VADAS: The present situation of the birth rate gives much work to the
Ministry of Health and the health agencies. To solve these problems and the
tasks they involve is something with which we have to deal continuously and
effectively. May I add that we can attain a healthy birth rate quota and an
adequate composition of age groups .by an annual “total” of 30.000 extra
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births. I am sure that our State will do everything possible for the
development of a healthy demographic picture, so that Socialist achievements
and ideals may be carried on by a healthy new generation, and not a nation
reminiscent of a waning moon. But I think that this is only one side of the
question and that society, public opinion and the public attitude also must
change. A people building Socialism not only has‘to plan its economic future,
but its demographic development as well.
E
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